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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Act)l was enacted in 1980, 
• Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Michigan. J.D., 1986; M.B.A., 1986; 
A.B., 1982, University of Michigan. The author gratefully acknowledges the research support 
of the University of Michigan School of Business Administration. 
1 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C §§ 9601-9675 
(1988) [hereinafter CERCLA], as amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization 
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 [hereinafter SARA]. The Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 6301, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-319 (1990) 
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courts and commentators alike have struggled to understand and 
apply its obscure and conflicting language. What types of acts should 
give rise to liability? Who should be held liable for CERCLA viola-
tions? What standard or standards should be used to gauge that 
liability? The answers to these, and other, questions regarding the 
scope of CERCLA liability remain in dispute. One conclusion that 
all can agree upon, however, is that the statute is poorly drafted 
and analytically incomplete. 2 
In fleshing out CERCLA's sparse and inadequate language, the 
courts, quite understandably, have often been sidetracked by the 
deficiencies of the Act's specific provisions and have lost sight of the 
larger statutory scheme and legislative goals. Nowhere is this prob-
lem more readily apparent than in cases addressing individual lia-
bility for the CERCLA violations of corporations. 3 All too often, 
courts have concentrated on determining how to hold specific parties 
liable under CERCLA, rather than upon whether the Act contem-
plates such liability. Commentators,4 as well, have focused primarily 
on whether, under current judicial interpretations of CERCLA lia-
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a» reauthorizes the Act until September 30, 1994, and provides 
$5.1 billion in funding. 
2 See, e.g., United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985) ("CERCLA has 
acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not 
contradictory, legislative history."); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. 
Co. (NEPACCO), 579 F. Supp. 823, 838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984) ("CERCLA is ... a hastily 
drawn piece of compromise legislation, marred by vague terminology and deleted 
provisions. . . . The courts are once again placed in the undesirable and onerous position of 
construing inadequately drawn legislation.") (citations omitted), afI'd in part, rev'd in part, 
810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); see generally Frank P. Grad, 
A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980,8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982). 
3 These cases are addressed infra Section IV.B (discussing current standards of officer 
liability under CERCLA) and Section V.B (discussing current standards of shareholder lia-
bility under CERCLA). 
4 See, e.g., Tom McMahon & Katie Moertl, The Erosion of Traditional Corporate Law 
Doctrines in Environmental Cases, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 29 (1988); Gregory P. 
O'Hara, Minimizing Exposure to Environmental Liabilitiesfor Corporate Officers, Directors, 
Shareholders, and Successors, 6 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1990); 
Harold J. Cronk & Pat Huddleston, II, Comment, Corporate Officer Liability for Hazardous 
Waste Disposal: What are the Consequences?, 38 MERCER L. REV. 677 (1987); Cynthia S. 
Korhonen & Mark W. Smith, Note, CERCLA Defendants: The Problem of Expanding Lia-
bility and Diminishing Defenses, 31 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 289 (1987); Todd W. 
Rallison, Comment, The Threat to Investment in the Hazardous Waste Industry: An Analysis 
of Individual and Corporate Shareholder Liability Under CERCLA, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 
585. 
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bility provisions, corporate officers5 and shareholders6 may be sub-
jected to liability for the CERCLA violations of their corporations 
in a far wider set of circumstances than corporate law doctrine 
contemplates. 7 They worry that case law under CERCLA has some-
how eroded the traditional protections of corporate law. 
These courts and commentators have skipped the initial, and more 
pressing, question: should these individuals be held personally liable 
under the statutory language of CERCLA? The Act never refers to 
the liability of these individuals specifically; instead, the courts have 
read the statute broadly as encompassing these parties within its 
provisions. By attempting to explain their holdings in terms of CER-
CLA's statutory framework, the courts have turned their backs on 
traditional corporate law doctrines, and have instead forged new 
grounds for imposing individual liability for corporate environmental 
violations. 8 Not surprisingly, given the inadequate drafting and mea-
5 I have chosen to analyze only corporate officer liability in this Article because that is the 
major category of individual liability under CERCLA that courts to date have addressed. See, 
e.g., infra note 99 (discussing dearth of CERCLA cases addressing director liability). 
6 This Article focuses solely on individual shareholders. A number of cases have also held 
parent corporations liable for the CERCLA violations of their subsidiaries. See generally 
LyndaJ. Oswald & Cindy A. Schipani, CERCLA and the "Erosion" of Traditional Corporate 
Law Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 259, 301-15 (1992) (discussing parent corporation liability 
under CERCLA). 
7 I use the phrase "corporate law doctrine" loosely in this Article to include the protections 
customarily extended to both shareholders and to corporate agents, such as officers and 
employees. This latter group of individuals is more precisely protected by principles of agency 
and tort law; corporate law, on the other hand, protects corporate owners (shareholders). I 
have chosen, for the sake of expediency, to use the phrase in its broader, perhaps more 
colloquial, sense. Although I may have sacrificed some degree of precision, the result is less 
cumbersome than referring to "corporate, agency, and tort law doctrines" repeatedly through-
out the Article. 
S Under traditional corporate law doctrine, corporate officers and shareholders are generally 
immune from liability for the actions of the corporation unless, of course, the officer personally 
participated in the tortious or illegal acts of the corporation, or the circumstances warrant a 
piercing of the corporate veil to hold the shareholders liable. See Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89-90 (1985) 
("The rule of limited liability means that the investors in the corporation are not liable for 
more than the amount they invest .... The managers and the other workers are not vicariously 
liable for the firm's deeds."). Under traditional principles of tort and agency law, corporate 
officers can be held personally liable for their own torts, regardless of whether they were 
acting in an official capacity when they committed the wrongs. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF AGENCY § 343 (1958); JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR., THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS & 
DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE § 3.13 (1982); 3A WILLIAM FLETCHER, 
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1135 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 
1986). When the officer is held individually liable, the corporation generally is also liable under 
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ger legislative history of the statute,9 the resulting decisions are 
marked by inconsistent analyses and conflicting standards and inter-
pretations. 
While most of the cases decided thus far do not, based upon their 
facts, indicate an abrogation of traditional doctrines,1O the sweeping 
language of the opinions discussing individual liability under CER-
CLA certainly creates the potential for an expansion of liability 
beyond traditional dictates. It is not at all clear that Congress in-
tended such an expansion in liability when it enacted CERCLA, nor 
is it clear that such an expansion is consistent with the rationale of 
CERCLA's statutory goals of cleaning up contaminated sites and 
ensuring that, to the extent feasible, those responsible for the con-
the doctrine of respondeat superior. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 230, at 608 (3d ed. 1983). Thus, both the corporation and the officer may be 
held liable for harm arising from a single tortious act. See 3A FLETCHER, supra, § 1135. 
Actual personal participation in the tort, through affirmative actions of direction, sanction, or 
cooperation in the wrongful acts of commission or omission, is necessary. See BISHOP, supra, 
§ 3.13, at 3-50 ("Participation by an officer in a wrongful act of the corporation may be found 
not solely on the basis of direct action but may also consist of knowing approval or ratification 
of unlawful acts."); 3A FLETCHER, supra, § 1137 ("[AJn officer or director of a corporation is 
not liable for torts in which he has not participated, of which he has no knowledge, or to 
which he has not consented. "). Liability is not imposed upon the officer merely because of his 
or her status within the corporation. See Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Shipowners & Merchants 
Towboat Co., 467 F. Supp. 841, 852 (N.D. Cal. 1979) ("Courts have, however, consistently 
stated that a corporate executive will not be held vicariously liable, merely by virtue of his 
office, for the torts of his corporation."), afl'd, 658 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 
U.S. 1018 (1982); 3A FLETCHER, supra, § 1137 (officers are held liable because of their 
wrongful or negligent acts, not because of their status). Rather, "[wJhat is required is some 
showing of direct personal involvement by the corporate officer in some decision or action 
which is causally related to plaintiff's injury." Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 
619 F.2d 902, 907 (1st Cir. 1980). Likewise, "personal responsibility for corporate liability may 
attach when the individual's wrongful conduct causes the violation of a statute and accom-
panying regulations .... " Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Herrington, 826 F.2d 16, 25 
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987). 
Generally, a shareholder is not liable for the debts of the corporation beyond his or her 
investment in the corporation. See REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.22; Easterbrook & 
Fischel, supra, at 89-90. In appropriate circumstances, however, the "corporate veil" can be 
"pierced" and the shareholders subjected to personal liability for the corporation's debts. See 
infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text (discussing piercing of corporate veil under tradi-
tional doctrine). 
9 See supra note 2 (discussing CERCLA's inadequate drafting and sparse legislative his-
tory). 
10 In a recent examination of CERCLA case law, Schipani and I concluded that, generally, 
the outcomes the courts have reached in these cases are consistent with the outcomes the 
courts would have reached had they applied traditional corporate law doctrine instead of the 
statutory language of CERCLA. See Oswald & Schipani, supra note 6, at 329. Our research 
also revealed, however, that while the courts have reached typical corporate law outcomes in 
CERCLA cases, they have not applied typical corporate law rules in doing so. [d. That is the 
issue that this Article addresses. 
1993] STRICT LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA 583 
tamination bear the costs of that cleanup.11 Imposition of personal 
liability upon individuals, whether officers or shareholders, has typ-
ically been regarded as the exception, not the norm, in corporate 
law. 12 Before the courts abandon well-established legal principles in 
favor of a statutory extension of liability, they should be certain that 
the legislature intended such an extension; likewise, before the leg-
islature mandates such an expansion of liability, it should be certain 
that expanded liability furthers, rather than hinders, its legislative 
goals and objectives. 
This Article thus addresses a very rudimentary, but overlooked, 
issue: "As a normative matter, should corporate officers and indi-
vidual shareholders be held statutorily liable under CERCLA?" 
CERCLA is a strict liability statute;13 its language sets forth cate-
gories of responsible persons who can be held liable for cleanup costs 
even where they have not acted intentionally or negligently in cre-
ating the harm. Nevertheless, the courts have not yet held all cor-
porate officers and shareholders strictly liable for the CERCLA 
violations of the corporations with which they are associated. Rather, 
the courts have held liable only those persons whose egregious be-
havior would have met the traditional legal standards for intentional 
or negligent acts. 
To reach their results, the courts appear to take the position that 
although responsible persons are strictly liable under the statute, 
officers and shareholders meet the statutory definition of "potentially 
responsible person"14 only if they have engaged in some form of 
culpable behavior. Unfortunately, nothing in CERCLA's statutory 
language or legislative history permits the consideration of culpabil-
ity in determining liability under the Act; in fact, such a notion is 
fundamentally at odds with CERCLA's strict liability scheme. Even 
though most of the cases decided thus far reach intuitively correct 
outcomes based upon their partiCUlar facts, the courts have enunci-
ated broad statements of law that could be applied inappropriately 
to hold liable officers and shareholders whose actions do not reveal 
lJ H.R. REP. No. 253(111), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 
3038 (noting that Congress' goals in enacting CERCLA were: "(1) to provide for clean-up if a 
hazardous substance is released into the environment or if such release is threatened, and (2) 
to hold responsible parties liable for the costs of these clean-ups"). 
12 See supra note 8 (discussing personal liability of officers and shareholders under traditional 
doctrines). 
13 See infra Section III.B (discussing CERCLA's strict liability standard). 
14 See infra note 28 (providing statutory definition of "potentially responsible person" 
(PRP». 
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any basis for individual liability. These cases seem to stand for the 
propositions that: (1) responsible persons are strictly liable under 
CERCLA; and (2) individual officers and shareholders may be re-
sponsible persons. The only logical inference to be drawn from these 
two statements is that officers and shareholders may be strictly liable 
under CERCLA; it is small comfort that no court has yet taken the 
stated rules of law to their inevitable conclusion. 
As CERCLA enters its second decade, the time is ripe to step 
back and reconsider the Act's statutory language, goals, and objec-
tives. The fault-based standards the courts have enunciated have no 
place within CERCLA's strict liability scheme. This is not to say 
that officers and shareholders can never be held individually liable 
for cleanup costs. The courts should recognize, however, that tra-
ditional principles of law already provide adequate mechanisms for 
holding these parties personally liable in appropriate circumstances. 
Instead of attempting to force a square peg into a round hole, the 
courts should acknowledge that individual liability for CERCLA 
violations necessarily arises under traditional doctrine, not under 
CERCLA's statutory language. 
Section II of this Article describes the statutory scheme of CER-
CLA. Additional background information is provided in Section III, 
which examines the rationales typically put forth in support of the 
strict liability standard and which discusses Congress' adoption of 
strict liability as the operative standard under CERCLA. Section 
IV analyzes the effect of applying strict liability to officers for the 
CERCLA violations of their corporations, and evaluates the fault-
based standards currently used by courts in assessing officer liability 
under CERCLA. Section IV concludes that both public policy goals 
and the statutory objectives of CERCLA are best served by the 
application of traditional tort and agency law principles to issues of 
officer liability, and that current judicial attempts to ground officer 
liability in CERCLA's statutory language are both unnecessary and 
doctrinally indefensible. 
The individual liability of shareholders for cleanup costs is exam-
ined in Section V. The result is the same: application of strict liability 
to shareholders would negate the traditional protections offered to 
these parties, yet nothing in CERCLA's statutory language or leg-
islative history indicates that Congress intended such a radical result 
when it enacted this legislation. Moreover, current judicial interpre-
tations of CERCLA's provisions to hold active shareholders person-
ally liable are based upon inaccurate readings of the statute and 
fundamental misunderstandings regarding the dual, but separate, 
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roles an active shareholder plays within the corporation. Finally, 
Section VI concludes with a discussion of the doctrinal, as well as 
practical, dangers inherent in the current judicial approach of basing 
individual liability in CERCLA's statutory language. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF CERCLA 
At the time of CERCLA's enactment in 1980, the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated that the United 
States produced 57 million metric tons of hazardous waste per year-
about 600 pounds per citizenl5-and that this amount would grow at 
an annual rate of 3.5 percent. 16 Ninety percent of this waste was 
being disposed of in environmentally unsound ways.17 More recent 
figures are just as disheartening: the EPA estimated that cleaning 
up the 1,200 sites on the 1989 National Priority List (NPL) would 
cost 30 billion dollars. 18 Researchers estimate that the NPL may 
ultimately contain 2,000 to 10,000 sites,19 which leads commentators 
to speculate that the entire cleanup bill Ultimately will reach 
hundreds of billions of dollars. 20 
CERCLA is one of several statutes Congress enacted in an at-
tempt to address the environmental issues that hazardous waste 
disposal poses.21 CERCLA is a remedial statute, designed to rectify 
the problems presented by hazardous substances produced and aban-
15 S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T 
& PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND), 
vol. I, at 310 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
16 [d. 
17 [d. 
18 EPA, A MANAGEMENT REVIEW OF THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM 3 (1989). 
19 E.W. COLGLAZIER ET AL., ESTIMATING RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS FOR NPL SITES 1 
(Dec. 1991) (copies available from the University of Tennessee Waste Management Research 
and Education Institute). 
20 See RICHARD H. GASKINS, ENVIRONMENTAL ACCIDENTS: PERSONAL INJURY AND PUBLIC 
RESPONSIBILITY 64-65, 231 (1989). A recent study by the University of Tennessee's Waste 
Management Research and Education Institute estimates that cleanup of Superfund sites is 
likely to cost between $106 and $302 billion over the next 30 years (measured in 1990 dollars). 
See MILTON RUSSELL ET AL., HAZARDOUS WASTE REMEDIATION: THE TASK AHEAD 16 (Dec. 
1991) (copies available from the University of Tennessee Waste Management Research and 
Education Institute). 
21 Other major federal environmental statutes include the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k (1988); the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1387 (1988); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988); the Toxic Substances Control 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1988); and the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 
U.S.C. §§ 401-67 (1988). 
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doned in the past. 22 Imposition of liability under CERCLA generally 
requires findings that the contaminated property or site is a facility, 
a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from the 
facility has occurred, response costs have been incurred as a result 
of the release or threatened release, and the party to be held liable 
falls within one of the four classes of responsible parties described 
in section 107 of CERCLA.23 "Hazardous substance" is defined 
broadly under the statute,24 as is "facility."25 "Release" is defined to 
include spills, leaks, dumping, emissions, or any other means by 
which a hazardous substance is released into surface or subsurface 
water or land, or the ambient air. 26 
CERCLA also imposes liability upon a broad range of environ-
mental actors. As the United States Supreme Court has noted, "The 
remedy that Congress felt it needed in CERCLA is sweeping: every-
one who is potentially responsible for hazardous-waste contamination 
22 See, e.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st 
Cir. 1986) (Congress intended CERCLA to provide EPA with effective means of responding 
to problems of hazardous waste, and to ensure that those responsible for hazardous waste 
problems pay for the harm created). 
23 See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1989); United States 
v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1379 (8th Cir. 1989); Ascon Properties, Inc. v. 
Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1989); Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste 
Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1511-42 (1986) [hereinafter Developments]. 
24 Section 101(14) of CERCLA defines "hazardous substances" to include substances defined 
as hazardous or toxic under the Clean Water Act § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A) (1988); 
CERCLA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 9602 (1988); RCRA § 3001,42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1988); Clean Water 
Act § 307(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (1988); Clean Air Act § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988); and 
Toxic Substances Control Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1988). CERCLA specifically does not 
apply to the release of petroleum, crude oil, or natural gas. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988). 
25 CERCLA defines "facility" as: 
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any 
pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, 
impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or air-
craft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, 
disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any 
consumer product in consumer use or any vessel. 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988). "Vessel" is defined as "every description of watercraft or other 
artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water." 
[d. § 9601(28). The courts have applied the definition of "facility" broadly. See, e.g., Tanglewood 
E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572-73 (5th Cir. 1988) (residential 
subdivision is a "facility"); Washington v. Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529, 532 (W.D. Wash. 
1988) (filter cake); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1305 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (stable, 
road, and spray trucks); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 895 (E.D.N.C. 1985) 
(roadside); New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 295-97 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) 
(dragstrip); United States v. Metate Asbestos Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1143, 1148 (D. Ariz. 1984) 
(trailer park). 
26 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8), (22) (1988). 
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may be forced to contribute to the costs of cleanup."27 Section 107 
of CERCLA lists four classes of potentially responsible parties 
(PRPs): (1) the current owner and operator of a hazardous waste 
vessel or facility; (2) any person who formerly owned or operated a 
facility at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance; (3) any 
person who arranged for disposal or treatment of a hazardous sub-
stance at any facility owned or operated by another person (an 
"arranger" or "generator"); and (4) any transporter of hazardous 
waste to a facility.28 "Person" is defined broadly in the Act to include 
individuals as well as corporations and other business entities. 29 
27 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,21 (1989). 
28 Section 107 states in relevant part: 
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the 
defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, 
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or 
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, 
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or 
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, 
of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other' party or 
entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or 
entity and containing such hazardous substances, and 
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to 
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, 
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence 
of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Govern-
ment or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency 
plan; 
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent 
with the national contingency plan; 
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including 
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such 
a release; and 
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under 
section 9604(i) of this title. 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). The defenses are set forth in id. § 9607(b) (quoted in note 39 
infra). 
29 "The term 'person' means an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, con-
sortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, 
commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." Id. § 9601(21). Although 
"person" is defined under CERCLA to include individuals, the statute does not specify which 
individuals may be held liable, nor under what circumstances or in what capacities. See id. 
Some environmental statutes, on the other hand, specifically name officers, agents, and/or 
shareholders as potentially liable parties, see, e.g., Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300f(12) (1988); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b)(4) 
(1988), while still others refer directly to "responsible corporate officers." See, e.g., Clean Air 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(3) (1988); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (1988). One 
commentator has suggested three alternative reasons for these definitional differences. First, 
Congress may have intended to hold liable corporate officers, agents, and employees under 
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Congress provided two agency mechanisms and one private mech-
anism for achieving CERCLA's statutory goals. First, section 104 
authorizes the government to clean up a site itself,3o using the re-
sources of "Superfund. "31 The EPA may recoup its expenses by 
bringing a cost recovery action against a PRP, provided the cleanup 
was "not inconsistent with" the National Contingency Plan (N CP), 32 
which specifies the substantive and procedural requirements for a 
proper cleanup action. 33 Second, under section 106, the government 
may issue an order requiring a person to clean up a site. 34 Finally, 
under section 107, private parties may sue PRPs to recover costs 
incurred in the cleanup of a site. 35 
statutes where they are specifically named, but not under statutes, such as CERCLA, where 
they are not. See David W. Tundermann, Personal Liability for Corporate Directors, Officers, 
Employees and Controlling Shareholders Under State and Federal Environmental Laws, 31 
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 2-1, 2-8 (1985). Alternatively, Congress may have meant to hold 
officers, agents, and employees to a different standard than proprietors, general partners, or 
controlling shareholders who act as owners and operators (i.e., the former would be held liable 
where they personally participated in the violation, but the latter would be held liable even 
where they did not). ld. at 2-8 to 2-9. I am more persuaded by Tundermann's third alterna-
tive-that the drafters simply did not consider the implications of the different standards 
used. ld. at 2-8. I believe it is unlikely that Congress meant to convey any important message 
regarding the extent of individual liability simply through its use of inconsistent terms 
throughout the various federal environmental statutes. 
30 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988). 
31 Superfund is a hazardous substance trust fund created to enable the EPA to finance 
immediate cleanup of abandoned waste chemical dump sites "where a liable party does not 
clean up, cannot be found, or cannot pay the costs of cleanup and compensation." S. REP. No. 
848, supra note 15, at 13, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, vol. I, at 
320. Superfund is funded through a tax that falls predominantly on petrochemical companies. 
The fund is created under 26 U.S.C. ch. 98A, 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988). Section 111 ofCERCLA, 
42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988), specifies the manner in which the fund may be used. 
32 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988). 
33 See id. § 9605 (EPA is required to promulgate revisions to NCP to establish "procedures 
and standards for responding to releases of hazardous substances, pollutants and contami-
nants."). The EPA has published the National Priorities List (NPL), see 40 C.F.R. Pt. 300, 
app. B (1991); 42 U.S.C. § 9605(8)(b) (1988), a list of the worst sites in the country. As of 
February, 1992, 1,183 sites were listed on the NPL and the EPA had proposed to add 52 
additional sites. See 57 Fed. Reg. 4824, 4825 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. Pt. 300) 
(proposed Feb. 7, 1992). Long-term remedial actions generally can be undertaken only at an 
NPL site. The National Contingency Plan (NCP) provides that Superfund-financed remedial 
actions, excluding remedial planning activities pursuant to CERCLA § 104(b), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9604(b) (1988), may be taken only at NPL sites. 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b)(1) (1992). 
34 See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). These orders are not restricted to sites on the NPL. See 
id. 
35 ld. § 9607(a)(4)(B). See generally Jeffrey M. Gaba, Recovering Hazardous Waste Cleanup 
Costs: The Private Cause of Action Under CERCLA, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 181 (1986). The 
government is not required to approve a private cleanup plan, and the only precondition to a 
private recovery action is that the plaintiff must have incurred costs undertaking a cleanup 
that is consistent with the NCP. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 300.700 
(1992). 
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The courts have determined that joint and several liability is 
permitted in cases of indivisible harm,36 and that costs may be allo-
cated among PRPs based upon principles of contribution or equitable 
apportionment. 37 More importantly for the purposes of this Article, 
the courts have construed CERCLA as imposing strict liability upon 
responsible parties. 38 With the exception of some very narrow de-
fenses,39 proof of the defendant's exercise of care or lack of fault is 
irrelevant. 
36 United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988) ("While CERCLA does 
not mandate the imposition of joint and several liability, it permits it in cases of indivisible 
harm."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); see also United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 
F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1990); cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 
178-79 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied. 493 U.S. 1071 (1990). See generally Alice T. Valder, Note, 
The Erroneous Site Selection Requirement for Arranger and Transporter Liability Under 
CERCLA, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 2074, 2079-81 (1991) (discussing joint and several liability 
under CERCLA). 
37 See Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1003 (D.N.J. 1988). SARA 
added an express right of contribution among PRPs. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988) ("Any 
person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable" under 
CERCLA.). See generally F. James Handley, CERCLA Contribution Protection: How Much 
Protection?, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,542 (1992); Steven Baird Russo, Note, 
Contribution Under CERCLA: Judicial Treatment After SARA, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
267 (1989). 
38 See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1418 
(8th Cir. 1990) ("CERCLA is a strict liability statute"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991); 
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d at 167 & n.11 ("We agree with the overwhelming body of precedent 
that has interpreted section 107(a) as establishing a strict liability scheme."); New York v. 
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 
1290 (D.R.I. 1986); United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 204 (W.D. 
Mo. 1985). See generally infra Section III.B (discussing CERCLA's strict liability standard). 
39 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988) provides: 
(b) There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise 
liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat 
of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused 
solely by-
(1) an act of God; 
(2) an act of war; 
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the 
defendant, other than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a con-
tractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except where 
the sole contractual arrangement arises from a published tariff and acceptance for 
carriage by a common carrier by rail), ifthe defendant establishes by a preponderance 
of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance 
concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous SUbstance, 
in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against 
foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could 
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions; or 
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs. 
In addition, id. § 9607(j) provides that liability for a "federally permitted release," as defined 
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The scope of liability applicable under CERCLA can be viewed 
on two levels: the liability of the first tier of defendants (assumed, 
for the purpose of this Article, to be the corporation that actually 
committed the violation) versus the liability of the second tier of 
defendants (the officers or individual shareholders who may also be 
held liable for the corporation's violation). The liability of the cor-
poration is direct and is based upon its involvement in activities that 
resulted in the CERCLA violation. Under the language of the Act, 
the applicable standard of liability here is strict liability;40 the cor-
poration need not have acted willfully, or even negligently. The 
question is whether the liability of the second tier of defendants 
should be direct (i.e., a liability based upon the individual's status 
as a responsible person within the meaning of CERCLA) or deriv-
ative (i.e. a liability based upon the traditional agency or corporate 
law theories that hold corporate actors responsible for certain acts 
taken by or on behalf of the corporation). Should corporate officers 
and shareholders be strictly liable under CERCLA, or should they 
be liable only for their own culpable acts? 
III. THE STRICT LIABILITY STANDARD 
CERCLA's legislative history indicates that Congress did not 
explicitly consider whether these corporate individuals should be 
held liable, much less what standards should be used in assessing 
their liability.41 The legislative history does indicate, however, that 
Congress intended that the general standard of liability under CER-
CLA be strict liability. 42 Thus, an examination of the policy rationales 
underlying strict liability is helpful in evaluating the scope of CER-
CLA liability. 
A. Rationales Underlying Strict Liability 
Strict liability is generally defined as "liability that is imposed on 
an actor apart from either (1) an intent to interfere with a legally 
in id. § 9601(10), shall not be extended beyond existing law. For a discussion of these defenses, 
see generally Grad, supra note 2, at 9; Developments, supra note 23, at 1518. 
40 See infra Section III.B (discussing CERCLA's strict liability standard). 
41 Legislative history reveals that Congress intended the courts to fill in missing pieces of 
the statute. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. 31,965 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio), reprinted in 
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, vol. I, at 778 ("Issues of joint and several liability 
not resolved by this shall be governed by traditional and evolving principles of common law. "); 
id. at 30,932 (statement of Sen. Randolph), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 
15, vol. I, at 686 ("It is intended that issues of liability not resolved by this act, if any, shall 
be governed by traditional and evolving principles of common law."). 
42 See infra Section III.B (discussing CERCLA's strict liability standard). 
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protected interest without a legal justification for doing so, or (2) a 
breach of a duty to exercise reasonable care, i.e., actionable negli-
gence. "43 Modern strict liability, with its emphasis on public policy 
objectives such as compensation of victims and social insurance, 
represents a dramatic shift from the fault-based liability regimes of 
nineteenth-century tort law. 44 Although the "fault" earlier courts 
considered dealt more with a departure from societal norms than 
with moral blameworthiness,45 the adoption of strict liability-where 
conduct can lead to liability even where the defendant is not morally 
culpable and has not departed from a reasonable standard of care-
has expanded defendants' potential legal liabilities. 
Today, the common law employs strict liability to hold defendants 
liable for certain actions, such as hazardous activities46 or the man-
43 w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 534 
(5th ed. 1984). 
44 See id. at 535. The earliest forms of tort law were not concerned with notions of "fault" 
but rather with keeping the peace between individuals. See id. at 534. As the nation started 
to industrialize, however, the negligence standard, as well as other common law doctrines, 
evolved "to create immunities from legal liability and thereby to provide substantial subsidies 
for those who undertook schemes of economic development." MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 99-100 (1977). 
45 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 43, § 75, at 535-36. 
46 Strict liability gained one of its earliest toeholds in American law in the context of 
hazardous activities, although early courts also imposed strict liability in a limited number of 
other contexts (e.g., for certain harm caused by animals). See generally KEETON ET AL., 
supra note 43, § 76. Hazardous activity strict liability is generally acknowledged as originating 
in the 1865 English case of Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H. & C. 744, 159 Eng. Rep. 737, rev'd, 
L.R. 1 (Ex. 265) (1866), aIi'd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (English & Irish Appeals), where the 
court determined that strict liability should be imposed for injury resulting from a "non-
natural" use of the defendant's land, but not for injury resulting from "any purpose for which 
it might in the ordinary course of enjoyment of land be used." Id. at 338. See also John G. 
Anderson, Comment, The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine in America: Abnormally Dangerous, 
Ultrahazardous, or Absolute Nuisance?, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 99, 102. 
The Second Restatement of Torts provides that "[o]ne who carries on an abnormally dan-
gerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another 
resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(1) (1977). Section 520 lists six factors to be considered 
in determining whether strict liability is the appropriate standard in any given instance: 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of 
others; 
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; 
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; 
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; 
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and 
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous 
attributes. 
Id. § 520. No one factor is determinative, and whether a specific activity is abnormally 
dangerous must be determined on a case-by-case basis. See Amland Properties Corp. v. 
Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784,804-05 (D.N.J. 1989) (quoting State Dep't of Envtl. 
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ufacture and sale of products,47 that result in harm to others. Im-
position of strict liability is guided by a number of policies and 
objectives, such as the promotion of fairness, economic efficiency, 
risk-spreading, and deterrence. 48 Although these policies have been 
explored most fully in the context of products liability, courts have 
enunciated them in the hazardous activities area as well. 49 Congress 
relied upon the theories behind both hazardous activity strict liability 
and strict products liability in defining the standard of liability under 
CERCLA.50 Thus, understanding the principles underlying common 
law strict liability is essential to understanding and evaluating the 
goals and objectives of CERCLA's strict liability scheme. 51 
Protection v. Ventron, 468 A.2d 150, 159 (N.J. 1983)). The fundamental question, in each 
instance, is whether the activity's "dangers and inappropriateness for the locality [are] so 
great that, despite any usefulness it might have for the community, it should be required as 
a matter oflaw to pay for any harm it causes .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520, 
comment f (1977). See generally Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of 
Hazardous Activity Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. REV. 257, 270-86 (1987) (discussing judicial 
application of Second Restatement's abnormally dangerous activity test). 
47 Strict products liability is intended to ensure that the costs of defective or injurious 
products are internalized into the cost of the product and are borne by the party best able to 
spread those costs throughout society, through either risk-spreading or liability insurance, 
and to discourage the manufacture and distribution of dangerous products while simultaneously 
encouraging the development of safer products. See William R. Ginsberg & Lois Weiss, 
Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 905-
06 (1981). 
48 See generally Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); Henningsen 
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 
1033, 1036 n.6 (Or. 1974). 
Commentators have explored the implications and ramifications of strict liability in numerous 
contexts. See, e.g., sources cited in notes 51,61 & 71 infra. Thus, the following discussion is 
intended only as a general overview of those arguments, and not as an exhaustive critique or 
explanation. 
49 See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 46, at 286-96 (arguing that many courts have rejected 
restrictive notions of hazardous activity liability as articulated in First and Second Restate-
ments in favor of social policy goals articulated in products liability area). 
50 See infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
51 Commentators vigorously disagree on whether, as a general policy matter, strict liability 
or negligence is the most economically efficient and/or just standard for imposing liability upon 
defendants. For example, Posner has criticized Calabresi's theory, discussed infra note 61, 
arguing that it has the same net effect on safety and economic efficiency as negligence has. 
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 
54-84 (1987); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.5 (4th ed. 1992); Richard 
A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 221 (1973). See also Mario 
J. Rizzo, Law and Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort, 9 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 291 (1980); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (1980). 
As interesting as the debate regarding the relative merits of negligence and strict liability 
may be, it is irrelevant to the purposes of this Article. Congress clearly sided with the 
proponents of the strict liability standard in adopting that standard as the controlling one for 
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1. Fairness 
One of the most basic rationales given for strict liability is that of 
fairness: where both parties are blameless, the party who created 
the risk of harm should bear the burden of loss. 52 Typically, the party 
who creates the harm will also derive most, if not all, of the economic 
benefit from the activity; thus, that party should bear the costs as 
well as reap the benefits of the activity. 53 Many commentators view 
purposes of CERCLA liability. See generally infra Section III.B (discussing CERCLA's strict 
liability standard). It is not necessary, for the purposes of this Article, to resolve the debate 
about whether strict liability in general is a defensible tort liability theory, nor is it necessary 
to decide whether strict liability is the appropriate standard of liability to apply to corporations 
that violate CERCLA. If it is not, strict liability is clearly not the appropriate standard to 
impose upon corporate individuals for CERCLA violations, and instead we should consider a 
fault-based standard. If it is, then we must consider the validity of those rationales as applied 
to the liability of corporate individuals, which is the focus of this Article. 
52 As stated by the Second Circuit in an early case: 
The extent to which one man in the lawful conduct of his business is liable for injuries 
to another involves an adjustment of conflicting interests. The solution of the problem 
in each particular case has never been dependent upon any universal criterion of 
liability (such as "fault") applicable to all situations. If damage is inflicted, there 
ordinarily is liability, in the absence of excuse. When, as here, the defendant, though 
without fault, has engaged in the perilous activity of storing large quantities of a 
dangerous explosive for use in his business, we think there is no justification for 
relieving it of liability, and that the owner of the business, rather than a third person 
who has no relation to the explosion, other than that of injury, should bear the loss. 
Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510,514 (2d Cir. 1931). Justice Blackburn had 
articulated a similar thought in Rylands: 
The person whose ... mine is flooded by the water from his neighbor's reservoir, 
or whose cellar is invaded by the filth of his neighbor's ... privy, or whose habitation 
is made unhealthy by the fumes or noisome vapors of his neighbor's alkali works, is 
damnified without any fault of his own; and it seems but reasonable and just that the 
neighbor, who has brought something on his own property which was not naturally 
there, harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property, but which he 
knows to be mischievous if it gets on his neighbor's, should be obliged to make good 
the damage which ensues .... But for his act in bringing it there no mischief could 
have accrued. 
Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H. & C.744, 159 Eng. Rep. 737, rev'd, L.R. 1 (Ex. 265) (1866), afi'd, 
L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (English & Irish Appeals). 
53 Some commentators view the mutuality of risk creation between the plaintiff and the 
defendant as an additional "fairness" argument supporting negligence doctrine. See, e.g., 
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542 (1972) 
("a victim has a right to recover for injuries caused by a risk greater in degree and different 
in order from those created by the victim and imposed on the defendant-in short, for injuries 
resulting from nonreciprocal risks"); Lawrence Void et ai., Aircraft Operator's Liability for 
Ground Damage and Passenger Injury, 13 NEB. L. BULL. 373, 380 (1935) (without mutuality 
of risk, negligence doctrine is no longer "inherently fair"). When no such mutuality is present, 
these commentators see strict liability as a "fairer" standard than negligence. See Fletcher, 
supra, at 546--51; Void et ai., supra, at 380-81; see generally Nolan & Ursin, supra note 46, 
at 290-91. Commentators disagree on whether strict liability actually promotes "fairness" and 
indeed, even on how "fairness" should be defined. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., 
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strict liability as a means for alleviating the unfairness that results 
from the traditional Learned Hand test for negligence,54 which re-
quires a defendant to compensate injured parties only where the 
risks outweigh the benefits of the conduct, regardless of where those 
risks and benefits fall. 55 As explained by Richard Epstein, strict 
liability achieves a "fairer" outcome: 
[I]f the gains derived from certain activities are indeed as great 
as the defendant contends, there is all the more reason why he 
should pay for the harm those activities caused to the person or 
property of another, for, as against an innocent plaintiff who has 
nothing to do with the creation of the harm in question, it is only 
too clear that the defendant who captures the entire benefit of 
his own activities should, to the extent that the law can make it 
so, also bear its entire costs. 56 
2. Internalization of Costs 
A related argument put forth for holding defendants strictly liable 
for certain activities is that certain costs should be "internalized." 
The theory of internalization of costs rests upon notions of economic 
efficiency and the workings of a free market economy. 57 Certain 
activities give rise to natural, even inevitable, risks of harm. The 
injuries caused by such an activity should be borne as a cost of that 
Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CAL. L. REV. 919, 934--39 (1981) 
(discussing arguments for and against "fairness" as rationale for strict liability). 
54 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) ("[I]f the 
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is 
less than L multiplied by P; i.e., whether B [is less than] PL."): 
55 Some commentators have criticized the negligence test on just these grounds. See, e.g., 
RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 29 (1980) (noting that "something 
is very wrong with a system" in which even slight outweighing of benefit over risk will result 
in no recovery to plaintiff); VoId et aI., supra note 53, at 382--83 (arguing that when benefit 
falls on defendant and injury falls on plaintiff, defendant ought to bear risk of that injury). 
56 EpSTEIN, supra note 55, at 27. A more recent variation on this theme is the theory of 
enterprise liability. "In its broadest terms the theory of enterprise liability in torts is that 
losses to society created or caused by an enterprise or, more simply, by an activity, ought to 
be borne by that enterprise or activity." Howard C. Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory 
of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153, 158 (1976); see generally James A. Henderson, Jr., The 
Boundary Problems of Enterprise Liability, 41 MD. L. REV. 659, 659 n.l (1982) ("In addition 
to the emphasis on compensating injured claimants on the basis of strict liability, 'enterprise 
liability" also connotes the shifting of liability from individual actors to the larger enterprises 
for which those actors engage in risk-creating conduct.'); George L. Priest, The Invention of 
Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985). 
57 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 87-90 (2d ed. 
1989); Barbara Ann White, Economizing on the Sins of Our Past: Cleaning Up Our Hazardous 
Wastes, 25 Hous. L. REV. 899, 915-17 (1988). 
1993] STRICT LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA 595 
activity; the injury should not be allowed to fall uncompensated upon 
an innocent victim. Societal welfare is maximized when the price of 
a good accurately reflects both its true cost and the degree of con-
sumer demand for the product. 58 In a properly functioning compet-
itive marketplace, prices will correlate closely to the costs of pro-
duction. If the price is lower than the costs of production, firms will 
leave the industry. If the price is too far above the costs of produc-
tion, competitor firms will be attracted to the abnormally high re-
turns, and the resulting increase in supply will lower prices. 59 
This pricing mechanism will not work, however, if firms and con-
sumers are not forced to bear all of the costs associated with the 
products that they produce or use. If the true costs of the good are 
not reflected in the price, consumers will demand an excess amount, 
resulting in an inefficient allocation of resources. 60 The solution, then, 
is to force the firm to internalize the externalities associated with 
its product, i.e., to force the firm to pay all of the costs associated 
with the good it produces. Because the price charged consumers 
then reflects the true cost of the good, market distortions and inef-
ficiencies are eliminated. 61 Thus, strict liability results in economic 
58 See White, supra note 57, at 915. 
59 See id. For a general discussion of the economic arguments in favor of internalizing costs, 
see Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141 (1979). 
60 See White, supra note 57, at 916-17. The economic principle of internalization was es-
poused by Pigou, in A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932). See generally 
Barbara White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72 IOWA L. REV. 
577, 580-83 (1987) (discussing Pigou's theory). 
61 See White, supra note 57, at 917. Guido Calabresi formulates this argument in economic 
terms, arguing that the best way to promote economic efficiency is to place the costs of injury 
on the "cheapest cost avoider"-the party who can best prevent or lessen accident costs. 
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 135 (1970). In his view, "[fJailure to include 
accident costs in the prices of activities will, according to the theory, cause people to choose 
more accident prone activities than they would if the prices of these activities made them pay 
for these accident costs, resulting in more accident costs than we want." Id. at 70. Where 
social costs and benefits cannot be determined with certainty, however, costs should generally 
be borne by the party best able to make a cost-benefit analysis. In the specific context of 
pollution, liability for external costs should be borne by the "cheapest cost avoider." If that 
party cannot be identified, the party who would face the lowest transaction costs in shifting 
pollution costs to the cheapest cost avoider should bear the costs. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi 
& A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096-97 (1972); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk 
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 502-08 (1961). Calabresi, in explaining 
his "resource-allocation" justification for strict liability, argues that efficient resource allocation 
and economic decision-making require that the actual and full costs of goods or services be 
known and accounted for. See generally Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test 
for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060-67 (1972). To achieve this latter goal, 
the actual cost of an activity must include the cost of the harm it does to society. See Roland 
N. McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 41-42 (1970). 
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resources being distributed throughout society in a manner that 
maximizes social welfare. 
3. Risk-Spreading/Insurance 
A third policy reason asserted for strict liability is that of risk-
spreading or, in effect, insurance.62 As Justice Traynor stated in his 
famous concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling CO.:63 
"The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an 
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, 
for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and dis-
tributed among the public as a cost of doing business."64 
The theory behind risk-spreading is that a loss causes less social 
and economic disruption if many people share it. 65 Forcing the de-
fendant to compensate the victim for his or her injuries encourages 
the defendant to increase the price of the good involved. The con-
sumers of a product can bear a slight increase in price more easily 
Forcing manufacturers to bear the costs of the resultant injuries leads to increases in prices, 
which, in turn, lead to decreased consumption of the goods, and a decrease in injuries. 
62 See Becker v. IRM Corp., 698 P.2d 116, 123 (Cal. 1985) ("paramount policy of the strict 
products liability rule remains the spreading throughout society of the cost of compensating 
otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing defects"). 
A different line of economic theory argues that internalization of costs often leads to 
economic inefficiency, and that economic efficiency is achieved instead by maximizing the total 
product of the parties. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-18, 
39-44 (1960). The merits of the two conflicting views are discussed in Talbot Page, Respon-
sibility, Liability, and Incentive Compatibility, 97 ETHICS 240 (1986) and White, supra note 
60, at 577-611. Coasian theory is premised on the argument that, in the absence of transaction 
costs and strategic behavior by the participants, the effects of externalities will be eliminated 
through voluntary bargaining by the participants. Coase, supra, at 6. In the context of 
pollution, however, where each incident generally involves a number of polluters and/or 
victims, the assumption of no transaction costs seems excessively optimistic. See Maureen L. 
Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
675, 680 (1992). 
63 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). 
64 Id. at 441 (Traynor, J. concurring). Justice Traynor's reasoning was eventually adopted 
by the California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 
1963), where the court stated: "The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of 
injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such 
products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect 
themselves." Id. at 901. The courts have since applied the theory to hazardous activities as 
well as products liability actions. See, e.g., Chavez v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp. 
1203, 1209 (E.D. Cal. 1976). Although many courts and commentators initially viewed the 
idea of risk-spreading with skepticism and suspicion, the notion is now widely accepted. See 
Nolan & Ursin, supra note 46, at 287 & n.250. 
65 See POSNER, supra note 51, at 164; Henderson, supra note 53, at 934. 
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than an injured party can bear the full costs of the harm incurred. 66 
To the extent the defendant is unwilling or unable to "self-insure" 
the product by bearing all of the costs of the injury directly and by 
passing those costs along to the consumer, the defendant can pur-
chase insurance in the marketplace, which will also serve to spread 
risk. Economic efficiency demands that the party best able to obtain 
that insurance-generally the manufacturer-should bear the cost 
of the insurance, and hence, the liability for the harm. 67 
4. Deterrence 
Closely related to the concept of risk-spreading is the notion of 
deterrence. Strict liability is thought to promote product safety. 68 
This argument takes two forms. First, the risk of harm should be 
placed upon the party best able to prevent or reduce that harm. 
Generally speaking, the entity engaged in the activity that causes 
the harm is in the best position to identify the attendant risks and 
to minimize their impact. 69 In the context of products liability, strict 
liability promotes efficient outcomes because manufacturers, as op-
posed to consumers or victims, are generally best able to undertake 
measures to increase product safety.70 Imposing strict liability on 
these manufacturers promotes product safety because it creates a 
financial incentive for manufacturers to find cost-effective ways to 
minimize risks associated with their products.71 Likewise, imposing 
strict liability on entities engaged in hazardous activities encourages 
them to reduce the dangers associated with their undertakings. 72 
66 See Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring); CALABRESI, supra note 61, at 39, 
51; Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability: The Gathering Storm, REG., Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 
15, 19-20. 
67 See Calabresi, supra note 61, at 500-02, 543-44. 
68 See, e.g., Turner v. General Motors, 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979) (Campbell, J., concur-
ring); CALABRESI, supra note 61, at 27; Epstein, supra note 66, at 15, 19-20. 
69 See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 61, at 1067-74; but see Frank I. Michelman, 
Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647, 
667-68 (1971) (Although assumption that "polluters are nearly always the cheapest cost 
avoiders ... may have a certain gross plausibility for the whole universe of pollution-nuisance 
cases, there is no a priori reason for believing it to be valid in any particular case."). 
70 See, e.g., William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the 
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1119 (1960). 
71 See David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 V AND. L. 
REV. 681, 711-13 (1980). 
72 See CALABRESI, supra note 61, at 541-43; POSNER, supra note 51, § 6.5, at 177-78 ("[I]f 
a class of activities can be identified in which activity-level changes by potential injurers 
appear to be the most efficient method of accident prevention, there is a strong argument for 
imposing strict liability on the people engaged in those activities. "). 
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The second deterrence argument is based more upon practical 
considerations than upon economic ones. As an evidentiary matter, 
negligence can be hard to prove even where it does exist. Plaintiffs 
face a difficult burden in demonstrating what a reasonable defendant 
should have known or done, and in gathering the evidence necessary 
to demonstrate the defendant's culpability.73 Courts and commenta-
tors have offered strict liability as an efficient means of addressing 
these problems of proof. 74 Strict liability increases the likelihood that 
the defendant will be held liable and thus increases the incentive for 
the defendant to undertake measures to reduce the risks associated 
with the product or the activity giving rise to the potential liability. 
B. Strict Liability Under CERCLA 
Thus, in evaluating whether strict liability should be imposed upon 
a defendant, modern tort theory asks who is better able, vis-a-vis 
the plaintiff and the defendant, to allocate the costs, insure against 
the risks, and reduce or warn against the inherent dangers of the 
activity or product?75 The legislative history of CERCLA indicates 
that Congress was concerned with these same questions when it was 
deciding what standard of liability was appropriate under the Act. 
Although the courts uniformly agree that strict liability applies to 
CERCLA violations,76 nowhere in the statute is that standard ac-
73 See, e.g., Aaron D. Twerski & Alvin S. Weinstein, A Critilzue of the Uniform Product 
Liability Lu,w-A Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221, 227-28 (1978--79). 
7. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 1982) (strict 
liability eliminates "complicated, costly, confusing, and time-consuming" task of proving that 
defendant knew or should have known of risk); SUPERFUND § 301(E) STUDY GROUP, 97TH 
CONG., 2D SESS., INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES-ANALYSIS AND 
IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES: REPORT TO CONGRESS IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 
301(E) OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABIL-
ITY ACT OF 1980 (P.L. 96-510), pt. 2, at 276 (Comm. Print 1982) (strict liability reduces 
plaintiff's "insuperable burden of proof") [hereinafter 301(E) STUDY GROUP]. As one treatise 
notes: 
[E]ven if fault or negligence were regarded as the primary justification for the 
imposition of liability on a manufacturer or other seller for the costs of accidents 
attributable to defective products, it is often present but difficult to prove, and for 
institutional reasons and because of the costs of litigation, proof of the existence of 
fault or negligence in the sale of a defective product should no longer be 
required .... 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 43, § 98, at 693; see also POSNER, supra note 51, § 6.5, at 179 
("The trial of a strict liability case is simpler than that trial of a negligence case because there 
is one less issue, negligence .... "). 
75 See supra Section III.A (discussing rationales underlying strict liability). 
76 See supra note 38. 
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tually stated. 77 Rather, section 101(32) of the Act provides that the 
"standard of liability" under CERCLA shall be the same as the 
standard of liability under section 311 of the Clean Water Act, 78 
which, although not explicit, has been interpreted by the courts as 
being strict liability.79 Although strict liability originally developed 
in the common law, statutory imposition of strict liability is by no 
77 CERCLA was a compromise bill hastily enacted by the 96th Congress in its final hours. 
CERCLA had three precursors: the Hazardous Waste Containment Act, H.R. 7020, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); the Comprehensive Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act, 
H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); and the Environmental Emergency Response Act, S. 
1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). H.R. 7020 contained a fault-based standard, imposing 
liability on "any person who caused or contributed to the release or threatened release" of a 
hazardous substance. H.R. 7020, supra, § 3071(a)(I)(c), reprinted in 126 CONGo REC. 26,779 
(1980). The accompanying Committee Report stated: 
[T)he usual common law principles of causation, including those of proximate causa-
tion, should govern the determination of whether a defendant "caused or contributed" 
to a release or threatened release .... Thus, for instance, the mere act of generation 
or transportation of hazardous waste, or the mere existence of a generator's or 
transporter's waste in a site with respect to which cleanup costs are incurred would 
not, in and of itself, result in liability .... [F)or liability to attach ... , the plaintiff 
must demonstrate a causal or contributory nexus between the acts of the defendant 
and the conditions which necessitated response action .... 
H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 
6136-37. 
Both the Senate Bill, S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1979), and the House Bill, H.R. 
85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1979), contained an explicit strict liability standard, but that 
standard was deleted from the final version of CERCLA in response to opposition from a 
number of representatives. See, e.g., 126 CONGo REC. 26,786 (1980), reprinted in A LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, vol. II, at 358-59 (statement of Rep. Stockman) (strict 
liability is not the proper standard under CERCLA). See generally 126 CONGo REC. 30,932 
(1980), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, vol. I, at 686 (statement of Sen. 
Randolph) (noting that "changes were made in recognition of the difficulty in prescribing in 
statutory terms liability standards which will be applicable in individual cases," but empha-
sizing that standard remained strict liability). 
Subsequently, H.R. 5640, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1985), a precursor to SARA, had explicit 
statements regarding "strict, joint and several liability." These provisions were omitted from 
the final version of SARA, however. See 132 CONGo REC. 28,414 (1986) (statement of Sen. 
Stafford) ("Such provisions were deleted from SARA because they are unnecessary given the 
clear and correct body of case law that has confirmed and developed the doctrine of strict, 
joint and several liability under Superfund and Section 311 of the Clean Water Act."). 
78 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988). See generally 126 CONGo REC. 31,965 (1980), reprinted in A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, vol. I, at 778 (statement of Rep. Florio) ("The standard 
of liability in these amendments is intended to be the same as that provided in section 311 [of 
the CWA); that is, strict liability."); id. at 30,932, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 15, vol. I, at 686 (statement of Sen. Randolph) ("I understand this to be a standard 
of strict liability."). The Clean Water Act was known as the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act prior to its amendment in 1977. 
79 See, e.g., United States V. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310, 1314 (7th Cir. 1978); United 
States V. Bear Marine Servs., 509 F. Supp. 710, 713 (E.D. La. 1980) (dictum). See generally 
New York V. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (discussing background 
of CERCLA's strict liability standard and its derivation from Clean Water Act). 
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means rare; Congress had adopted the standard in the environmental 
context on numerous occasions prior to enactment of CERCLA.80 In 
addition, in the decade preceding CERCLA, a number of commen-
tators had argued that strict liability was the appropriate stan<;lard 
for evaluating liability for injuries caused by environmental contam-
ination, analogizing environmental harm to both hazardous activities 
and to products liability.81 Thus, there had been foreshadowings of 
Congress' decision to incorporate the strict liability standard into 
CERCLA. 
In adopting the strict liability standard for CERCLA violations, 
Congress drew upon the rationales expressed in both the hazardous 
activities area and products liability.82 For example, CERCLA's 
legislative history indicates that Congress believed that persons who 
engage in the manufacture, use, or disposal of hazardous substances 
are engaged in hazardous activities of the type that normally lead 
to strict liability.83 Many risks associated with hazardous activities 
can be reduced or minimized with proper planning.84 Imposition of 
liability on the "factually responsible" party ensures that, to the 
80 See S. REP. No. 848, supra note 15, at 34~6, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 15, vol. I, at 341-43, for a listing of some of these statutes. 
81 See, e.g., Alfred Avins, Comment, Absolute Liability for Oil Spillage, 36 BROOK. L. REV. 
359 (1970); John C. Esposito, Air and Water Pollution: What to Do While Waiting for 
Washington, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 32, 38~9 (1970); Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 47, 
at 905-20; Milton Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 587, 616-17 (1969); Michelman, supra note 69, at 666-83; Note, Strict Liability for 
Generators, Transporters, and Disposers of Hazardous Wastes, 64 MINN. L. REV. 949, 983-
85 (1980). 
82 See S. REP. No. 848, supra note 15, at 14, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 15, vol. I, at 321 ("The most analogous areas of the law are product liability and liability 
for abnormally dangerous activities. "). One pair of commentators has recently speculated that 
the hazardous activities doctrine is likely to undergo a resurgence in the cleanup area. See 
generally Jim C. Chen & Kyle E. McSlarrow, Application of the Abnormally Dangerous 
Activities Doctrine to Environmental Cleanups, 47 Bus. LAW. 1031 (1992). 
83 See, e.g., 126 CONGo REC. 31,978 (1980), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 15, vol. I, at 813 (statement of Rep. Jeffords) ("For purposes of this bill, manufacture, 
use, transportation, treatment, storage, disposal and release of hazardous substances are 
ultrahazardous activities justifying the imposition of strict liability under the standards estab-
lished by section 311(0 of the Clean Water Act."); S. REP. No. 848, supra note 15, at 3~4, 
reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, vol. I, at 339-41 (noting that "manu-
facture, use, transportation and disposal of hazardous substances" are hazardous activities 
"and, therefore, subject to a rule of strict liability"). Nuisance theory provided an additional 
ground for imposition of strict liability. See S. REP. No. 848, supra note 15, at 14, reprinted 
in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, vol. I, at 321 ("Damage actions involving the 
maintenance of a public or private nuisance often involve a kind of strict liability standard."). 
84 See S. REP. No. 848, supra note 15, at 33, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 15, vol. I, at 340. 
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extent possible, risks will be eliminated.85 When a risk cannot be 
reduced or eliminated, however, and harm results, "fundamental 
fairness"86 requires that the party whose acts created the risk of 
harm bear the costs of that harm, even where both parties are 
blameless.87 Thus, harm resulting from environmental contamination 
should be borne by the party responsible for the harm's occurrence. 88 
CERCLA's legislative history also reveals an explicit reliance by 
Congress on the notion of internalization of costS.89 Congress saw 
85 [d. at 33-34, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, vol. I, at 340. 
86 [d. at 33, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, vol. I, at 340. 
87 [d. at 34, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, vol. I, at 341. 
88 See, e.g., id. at 98, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, at vol. I, at 
405: 
[S]ociety should not bear the costs of protecting the public from hazards produced in 
the past by a generator, transporter, consumer, or dumpsite owner or operator who 
has profited or otherwise benefited from commerce involving these substances and 
now wishes to be insulated from any continuing responsibilities for the present 
hazards to society that have been created. . . . Relieving industry of responsibility 
establishes a precedent seriously adverse to the public interest. 
See also 126 CONGo REC. 26,338 (1980), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 
15, vol. II, at 229 (statement of Rep. Florio) ("It is wholly appropriate and equitable for the 
industries which have benefitted most directly from cheap, inadequate disposal practices, and 
which have generated the wastes which imposed the risks on society to contribute a substantial 
portion of the response costs."); S. REP. No. 848, supra note 15, at 98, reprinted in A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, vol. I, at 405 (Sept. 25, 1979 letter of Douglas Costle, 
EPA Administrator) ("[S]ociety should not bear the costs of protecting the public from hazards 
produced in the past by a generator, transporter, consumer, or dumpsite owner or operator 
who has profited or otherwise benefitted from commerce involving the substances and now 
wishes to be insulated from any continuing responsibilites for the present hazards to society 
that have been created."). 
89 The comments made during the Senate proceedings on the day CERCLA was enacted 
make this clear. For example, Senator Proxmire stated: 
I wish to simply state that the polluting firms should be required to pay the full cost 
of pollution. . . . 
If they incur a cost, and heaven knows the disposal of chemicals is a cost, then 
they should pay for it in full. That is the way the free market should work. . . . If 
they do pay all of it, then the free market works. If they do not it does not. 
If they pay all of it then the customers of those corporations will pay, which they 
should pay, the full cost of what they buy. We certainly should not have the taxpayers 
or the victims of this pollution to have to pay any part of the cost of disposing of the 
chemicals and other effluents that the oil corporations and chemical corporations 
release into our environment. 
126 CONGo REC. 30,879 (1980); see also id. at 30,932, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 15, vol. I, at 685 (statement of Sen. Randolph) (strict liability "assures that the 
costs of chemical poison releases are borne by those responsible for the releases"); id. at 
30,940, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, vol. I, at 706 (statement of Sen. 
Bradley) ("the real cost of production includes safe disposal"); id. at 30,940, reprinted in A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, vol. I, at 708 (statement of Sen. Tsongas) (strict 
liability "puts the costs in the sector most responsible for pollution and which benefits most 
from chemical production, instead of on the victim or on the Government"). 
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strict liability as a way of "assur[ing] that those who benefit finan-
cially from a commercial activity internalize the health and environ-
mental costs of that activity into the costs of doing business."90 In 
addition to being a fairer standard, strict liability improves economic 
efficiency by ensuring that all costs associated with the product are 
internalized so that prices of goods fully reflect the goods' actual 
costs to society.91 According to the legislative history, "[s]trict lia-
bility is, in effect, a method of allocating resources through choice 
in the marketplace."92 
90 S. REP. No. 848, supra note 15, at 13, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 
15, vol. I, at 320. The Report went on to state: "To establish provisions of liability any less 
than strict, joint, and several liability would be to condone a system in which innocent victims 
bear the actual burden of releases, while those who conduct commerce in hazardous substances 
which cause such damage benefit with relative impunity." Id. 
Not all commentators agree that economic efficiency is best served by requiring polluters 
to internalize all costs associated with their activities. See, e.g., Dennis R. Honabach, Toxic 
Torts-Is Strict Liability Really the "Fair and Just" Way to Compensate the Victims?, 16 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 305, 310-16 (1982) (unclear where incidence of burden actually falls under 
strict liability scheme); Michelman, supra note 69, at 666-86 (strict liability is inefficient where 
cost to polluter in avoiding damage is greater than costs to neighboring residents). See 
generally supra note 61 (discussing commentators who disagree with internalization theory). 
91 S. REP. No. 848, supra note 15, at 33, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 
15, vol. I, at 340 ("One additional purpose of [CERCLA's] strict liability scheme is to assure 
that the costs of injuries resulting from defective or hazardous substances are borne by the 
persons who create such risks rather than by the injured parties who are powerless to protect 
themselves."). The Senate Report invoked the rationale of Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 
270 P. 952 (Cal. 1928), where the court stated: 
Where one, in the conduct and maintenance of an enterprise lawful and proper in 
itself, deliberately does an act under known conditions, and, with knowledge that 
injury may result to another, proceeds, and injury is done to the other as the direct 
and proximate consequence of the act, however carefully done, the one who does the 
act and causes the injury should, in all fairness, be required to compensate the other 
for the damage done. 
Id. at 955 (quoted in S. REP. No. 848, supra note 15, at 34, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 15, vol. I, at 341). The Senate Report stated: 
The most desirable system of loss distribution is one in which the prices of goods 
accurately reflect their full costs to society. This therefore requires, first, that the 
cost of injuries be borne by the activities which caused them, whether or not fault is 
involved, because, either way, the injury is a real cost of these activities. Second, it 
requires that among the several parties engaged in an enterprise the loss be placed 
on the party which is most likely to cause the burden to be reflected in the price of 
whatever the enterprise sells. 
S. REP. No. 848, supra note 15, at 34, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, 
vol. I, at 341. Some commentators argue that CERCLA goes too far in attempting to force 
polluters to bear the costs of their activities. See, e.g., John J. Lyons, Deep Pockets and 
CERCLA: Should Superfund Liability Be Abolished?, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 271, 304 (1986--
87) (noting that because CERCLA permits joint and several liability, PRP can be forced to 
bear cleanup costs in excess of harm created by its own activity). 
92 S. REP. No. 848, supra note 15, at 34, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 
15, vol. I, at 341. The Report stated more fully: 
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Finally, Congress was concerned with deterrence. Imposition of 
strict liability, Congress thought, would "create a compelling incen-
tive for those in control of hazardous substances to prevent releases 
and thus protect the public from harm,"93 in addition to providing 
an incentive for those parties to reduce their use of such substances. 94 
[d. 
In some of these cases the choice is not between an innocent victim and a careless 
defendant, but between two blameless parties. In such cases the costs should be 
borne by the one of the two innocent parties whose acts instigated or made the harm 
possible. 
The advantage of this approach is not only that it is fair, but that it will cause the 
economy to operate better. Strict liability is, in effect, a method of allocating resources 
through choice in the market place. 
The most desirable system of loss distribution is one in which the prices of goods 
accurately reflect their full costs to society. This therefore requires, first, that the 
cost of injuries be borne by the activities which caused them, whether or not fault is 
involved, because, either way, the injury is a real cost of these activities. Second, it 
requires that among the several parties engaged in an enterprise the loss be placed 
on the party which is most likely to cause the burden to be reflected in the price of 
whatever the enterprise sells 
.... [Slocial and economic resources are more efficiently allocated when the actual 
costs of goods and services (including the losses they entail) are reflected in their 
prices to the consumer. 
93 [d. at 14, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, vol. I, at 321. 
94 [d. As commentators have pointed out, however, the deterrent effect of strict liability 
under CERCLA is limited by the retroactive nature of CERCLA liability. See, e.g., Lyons, 
supra note 91, at 301 ("[Mlany of the actions that are within the reach of § 107(a) and have 
substantially contributed to the creation of the problem predate the enactment of CERCLA 
and therefore could not have been influenced by any deterrent effect arising from the liability 
provisions contained in CERCLA."); Developments, supra note 23, at 1541 ("Retroactive 
liability cannot promote the goal of creating incentives for safe handling and disposal of wastes, 
because it is not possible to change behavior that has already occurred. . . . Retroactive 
application of CERCLA must be aimed largely at the goals of compensating the Superfund 
and spreading cleanup costs among the responsible parties."); cf. White, supra note 57, at 
918-21 (CERCLA's retroactive liability will not result in efficiency gains). Although strict 
liability may deter future violations of CERCLA, it has no effect on past behavior. Nonethe-
less, CERCLA liability extends even to activities predating enactment of the statute. See, 
e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733, 737 (8th 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 
1064, 1073 (D. Colo. 1985); Ohio ex rei. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1314 (N.D. 
Ohio 1983). Moreover, liability under CERCLA is determined by current scientific knowledge 
and understanding of what is hazardous. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988) (defining "hazardous 
substances" as those EPA listed under authority of CERCLA or other specified federal 
statutes); United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 183 (W.D. Mo. 1985) 
(cost recovery actions may be brought only to clean up substances currently considered 
hazardous under these lists); compliance with prevailing standards at the time of contamination 
is irrelevant. See United States v. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448, 451 (D. Md. 1986) (compliance 
with existing law and exercise of reasonable care at time of disposal does not relieve a 
defendant of liability under CERCLA). 
Typically, tort law looks only at what a defendant knew or should have known at the time 
the tort occurred in assessing liability. See Lyons, supra note 91, at 292-93. Defendants 
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IV. LIABILITY STANDARDS FOR CORPORATE OFFICERS UNDER 
CERCLA 
CERCLA's legislative history clearly indicates that Congress be-
lieved that forcing "persons," as defined in the statute, to bear the 
full costs of their hazardous sUbstance-producing activities would 
result in more efficient decision-making processes and less environ-
mental contamination.95 The Act's legislative history reveals little or 
generally are not held liable for harm that the scientific community was unable to recognize 
or identify at the time the tort occurred. See id. Ex post evaluation of a product defect has 
been allowed in asbestos cases, but that is a rare exception to the general rule. See id. at 293. 
Epstein argues that the retroactive nature of asbestos liability destroys the rationale under-
lying the imposition of liability in that context because it "imposes on the firm the impossible 
task of complying with a liability rule of which it could not have had any knowledge." Richard 
A. Epstein, Manville: The Bankruptcy of Product Liability Law, REG., Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 
44. See also Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 
58 N. Y. U. L. REV. 796, 825 (1983) (arguing that it is "senseless" to believe that retroactive 
liability will promote risk-spreading, cost internalization, or deterrence); Walter M. Rogers, 
Note, "[l]t's All Right to Kill People, but Not Trees", 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 921-22 
n.113 (1991) (noting that courts and commentators have criticized the movement to hold 
manufacturers liable for failure to warn against unknowable hazards). An activity that was 
considered safe and acceptable in 1979, for example, could give rise to liability in 1992 if 
scientific advances were now to demonstrate its hazardousness. Thus, while CERCLA's strict 
liability scheme may deter future activities known or thought to present a risk of harm to the 
public, it can have no effect on past behaviors. 
Congress intended that CERCLA remedy some of the failings of earlier environmental 
legislation, particularly RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6901-92k (1988), which was a prospective statute 
intended to prevent future open dumping and to convert existing open dumps to safer facilities, 
in addition to regulating the treatment, storage, and transportation, and disposal of hazardous 
wastes. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 77, pt. 1, at 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 6125 (RCRA "is prospective and applies to past sites only to the extent that they are posing 
an imminent hazard. "). CERCLA was the result of congressional concern that a retrospective 
statute was also needed, to address the issues raised by hazardous waste produced and 
abandoned in the past. Id., pt. 1, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6120 (noting 
that RCRA is "clearly inadequate" in addressing "massive problem" of existing hazardous 
waste sites). Because CERCLA is a remedial statute, as opposed to a prospective one, the 
deterrence justification for CERCLA is questionable from the outset. 
The Supreme Court has stated that while retroactive liability cannot be justified based on 
grounds of deterrence or blameworthiness, it may nonetheless be a rational means of allocating 
the costs of an activity. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. I, 12, 18 (1976); 
see generally Michael P. Healy, Direct Liability for Hazardous Substance Cleanups Under 
CERCLA: A Comprehensive Approach, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 65, 82-85 (1992) (discussing 
retroactive nature of CERCLA liability). 
95 See generally supra Section IlLB (discussing legislative history of CERCLA's strict 
liability standard). See also 301(E) STUDY GROUP, supra note 74, pt. 2, at 275-76: 
The reasons for shifting the burden of risks and costs due to the dangerous nature 
of disposal of hazardous wastes are similar to the reasons underlying the imposition 
of strict liability in product liability cases. . . . 
Strict liability is imposed in product liability because it is recognized that without 
it most plaintiffs would face an insuperable burden of proof, and because the impo-
sition of liability on the manufacturer most readily and efficiently provides for cost 
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nothing of congressional intent regarding the personal liability of 
corporate officers, however.96 Although CERCLA speaks of "indi-
viduals" being liable for statutory violations, 97 the definitional section 
does not explicitly include or exclude corporate officers. 98 Thus, it is 
impossible to determine from either CERCLA's legislative history 
or its statutory language whether Congress intended that corporate 
officers be held liable and, if so, under what circumstances and what 
standards. 
Commentators have devoted most of their attention to date upon 
the latter issue, i.e., upon trying to determine which standard is 
most appropriately applied to corporate officers. The initial question 
that should be addressed, however, is not how officers should be 
held liable under CERCLA, but whether they should be held so 
liable. Because neither the statutory language of CERCLA nor its 
legislative history reveals whether Congress intended these parties 
to be individually liable as PRPs, it is necessary to consider whether 
imposition of liability upon them is compatible with CERCLA's sta-
tutory scheme and objectives. The only liability standard available 
under CERCLA is strict liability. To hold officers statutorily liable 
under the Act, therefore, the courts must hold them strictly liable. 
An examination of the policy objectives militating for and against 
application of strict liability to corporate officers reveals, however, 
internalization and for equitable distribution of the costs of product-caused injuries, 
and ideally, liability on the part of those best able to prevent or reduce the 
risks. . . . [S]trict liability for hazardous waste disposal would also encourage the 
reduction of risk, by disposers. So, too, the distribution of costs of injury is most 
easily passed on by imposing liability on the owner/manager of disposal sites who 
can spread the costs most easily, passing them along by liability insurance, or by 
transferring them to the generator of wastes. 
CERCLA authorized the creation of the Study Group to make recommendations to Congress 
regarding compensation for personal injuries caused by toxic waste sites. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9651(e). The Group ultimately recommended that strict liability was the appropriate stan-
dard. See generally James R. Zazzali & Frank P. Grad, Hazardous Wastes: New Rights and 
Remedies?, 13 SETON HALL L. REV. 446 (1983) (discussing Study Group's report and rec-
ommendations). 
96 Interestingly, the issue of corporate officer liability was raised once in the Senate hearings. 
Peter H. Weiner, Special Assistant, Governor's Office, State of California, stated: "[T]he bill 
should provide for piercing the corporate veil of undercapitalized corporations to establish 
individual liability of officers and directors." SEN. COMM. ON ENV'T & PUBLIC WORKS, Serial 
No. H9, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 155 (1979). Weiner's statement that piercing is a 
method that may be used to hold liable corporate officers and directors, as opposed to 
shareholders, is incorrect. See Oswald & Schipani, supra note 6, at 274-75. 
97 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21). 
98 Congress has, in some environmental statutes, specifically named officers as potentially 
liable parties. See supra note 29 (discussing environmental statutes that hold individuals 
personally liable). 
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that strict liability for officers has no basis in either public policy or 
in CERCLA's language. 99 
A. Application of the Strict Liability Standard to Officers 
From the fairness perspective, nothing is to be gained by holding 
the officer strictly liable in addition to the corporation. Under tra-
ditional tort and agency doctrine, corporate officers are not held 
strictly liable for the torts or illegal actions of their corporations. 
Rather, individual officer liability has always been premised upon an 
affirmative act of commission or omission on the part of the officer;lOo 
thus, individual officer liability has always flowed from a negligent 
or intentional act committed by the officer directly. The reasons for 
this result are obvious. In the context of a strict liability tort or 
statute, such as CERCLA, the liability of the primary defendant, 
the corporation, may well result from morally blameless behavior; 
in such an instance, the officer, as the secondary defendant, is like-
wise morally blameless. Notions of justice or fairness would not be 
served by holding the officer individually liable based merely upon 
his or her status as an officer, nor would the victim be injured by a 
refusal to hold the officer so liable. The corporation, as the primary 
defendant, remains strictly liable to the victimlOl for the harm in-
curred; thus, the victim is not barred from recovery even though 
the officer is shielded from liability. 
The same result follows from application of the argument that 
strict liability ensures that a defendant that captures the benefit of 
its own activities likewise bears the costs of those activities.102 As 
between the victim and the corporation committing the CERCLA 
violation, the corporation captures the benefit of the activities that 
99 I have deliberately excluded corporate directors from the analysis because no court has 
yet held an individual personally liable in his or her role as a director, although individuals 
who have held multiple roles within the corporation, including that of director, have been held 
personally liable based upon their actions undertaken in their roles as corporate officers or 
employees. See, e.g., United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D.N.C. 
1989); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884 (E.D.N.C. 1985). Discussions of "director" 
liability are misleading because they imply the existence of a liability that has yet to be 
judicially imposed. 
100 See supra note 8 (discussing traditional rules of officer liability). 
101 For purposes of CERCLA, the "victim" is society as whole, because everyone will be 
forced to bear the costs of environmental contamination that is not cleaned up by the respon-
sible party-taxpayers to the extent that they shoulder the burden of cleanup and the public 
as a whole to the extent that the contamination is not cleaned up and continues to pollute the 
environment. 
102 See EpSTEIN, supra note 55, at 27 (quoted in text supra note 56). 
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resulted in the contamination; thus, the corporation should bear the 
costs of the cleanup. Imposition of strict liability on the officer can 
be justified only if the officer is in a position to capture the benefit 
of the activities that led to the CERCLA violation. To the extent 
that any such benefits arise, however, they will manifest themselves 
in increased corporate earnings, which will eventually translate to 
increased dividends to the shareholders of the firm. The officer, qua 
officer, does not receive any additional direct benefit. Thus, while 
distributive fairness might be promoted by holding the corporation 
strictly liable, it is not furthered by holding the officer so liable. l03 
Fairness is by no means the only rationale offered for strict lia-
bility. Indeed, economic efficiency arguments predominate in this 
area. Maximization of societal welfare and efficient allocation of so-
cietal resources demand that all of the costs of an activity be fully 
internalized. lO4 Officers, unlike the corporations for which they work, 
are not in a position to internalize the costs associated with the 
corporation's activities that gave rise to the injury. Forcing the 
officer to bear the costs of the injury associated with his or her firm's 
activities will have no effect upon the pricing of the product involved 
because it will not be a cost borne by the firm, and therefore will 
have no impact on the firm's willingness to supply the product or on 
consumer demand for the goods produced. l05 Thus, inefficient allo-
cation of societal resources will not be reduced by holding an indi-
vidual liable for the harm that a company's environmental practices 
creates. 
N or are the goals of risk-spreadinglO6 served by holding corporate 
officers strictly liable. Any recovery received from an officer comes 
directly from that individual's pocket. The officer lacks the corpo-
ration's mechanisms for spreading those costs among the consumers 
103 It is not uncommon, particularly in closely-held corporations, for officers to also be 
shareholders of the corporation. Thus, some of these benefits may flow through to the officer 
in his or her capacity as a shareholder. The individual's dual role as officer and shareholder 
should be kept separate, however, because the bases for liability in each instance are different. 
See infra Section V (discussing liability of shareholders under CERCLA). 
104 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (discussing internalization of costs). 
105 An exception might exist if the firm purchases insurance to protect the officer from such 
claims. The firm could then pass the costs of that insurance along to consumers through its 
pricing schemes. The unavailability of environmental insurance, however, would prevent this 
mechanism from working in the CERCLA context. See generally infra note 107 (discussing 
unavailability of environmental insurance). In addition, the corporation would be unable to 
indemnify fully the officer because, in the event of a cleanup, the firm's assets could well be 
depleted in paying its own liabilities. See infra note 109 (discussing costs of cleanup). 
106 See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text (discussing risk-spreading rationale for 
strict liability). 
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of the goods or services involved. Although theoretically the officer 
could spread the risk of harm by purchasing insurance to cover the 
risk of individual liability, as a practical matter, environmental in-
surance is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. 107 Essentially, apply-
ing the strict liability standard to an officer simply sticks some other 
hapless individual, as opposed to the victim, with the costs of the 
injury that the corporation's CERCLA violation caused. 108 
Even where the corporation is financially unable to pay all of the 
costs of cleanup,109 no social policy objective is furthered by holding 
the officer strictly liable for the remaining costs. Even setting aside 
the practical constraints raised by the financial inability of most 
officers to pay the entire costs of cleanups themselves, imposition of 
liability on the officer in such an instance would force the officer to 
serve as an insurer of the firm's liabilities. Traditional corporate law 
has never contemplated such a result, nor does the legislative history 
of CERCLA indicate that Congress intended that its adoption of the 
strict liability standard under CERCLA result in such a radical 
revision of traditional corporate doctrine. 110 
107 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE: ISSUES SURROUNDING INSUR-
ANCE AVAILABILITY 17 (Oct. 16, 1987) (noting that "the uncertainties created by potentially 
enormous claim payments and unfavorable legal trends have led most of the insurance industry 
to perceive pollution as an uninsurable risk," and stating that GAO could find "only one insurer 
that actively seeks to insure pollution risks"); see generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, ENVI-
RONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF TOXIC TORT AND HAZARDOUS 
WASTE INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES 195-96 (1991) (noting that environmental liability 
coverage became "almost completely unavailable" in mid-1980's, and that only "an extremely 
thin market" provides such coverage today); Peter Huber, Environmental Hazards and 
Liability Law, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston, 
eds.) 128, 146-47 (1988) (discussing unavailability of environmental liability insurance). 
108 If the officer actively participated in the activities that led to the environmental violation 
and thus to the harm to the victim, we may well prefer that the officer bear the costs of that 
harm. In such an instance, however, traditional notions of officer liability will achieve this 
result. See supra note 8 (discussing traditional personal participation theory of officer liability). 
Strict liability, on the other hand, paints with too broad a brush, for it would apply both to 
the culpable and the nonculpable officer. 
109 The high costs of CERCLA cleanups are prohibitive to most smaller companies. The 
EPA estimated the average costs (in 1988 dollars) associated with a Remedial Investigation 
and Feasibility Study (RIfFS) and design and implementation of a remedy at an NPL site to 
be $1.3 million for the RIfFS, $1.5 million for remedial design, $25 million for remedial action, 
and $3.77 million for the present value of operation and management of the site remedy over 
30 years. See 57 Fed. Reg. 4824, 4829 (1992). 
110 One can well imagine the havoc that would be wreaked on American business if such a 
rule were adopted. Cj. BISHOP, supra note 8, § 1.04, at 1-8 (determination of corporate 
director liability requires balancing between "on the one hand, fairness to the individual and 
the need to induce competent people to serve, or at least not to discourage them from serving, 
as corporate directors" and "on the other hand, the undesirability of immunizing corporate 
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Moreover, individuals tend to be risk-averse. 111 If confronted with 
a remote but potentially devastating liability, many skilled and com-
petent individuals would be discouraged from serving as officers of 
corporations whose activities could possibly lead to environmental 
harm. In addition, corporate managers, who would receive only 
limited benefits from the corporate earnings attributable to hazard-
ous activities but who would face unlimited personal liability for 
potential harm, would likely direct their firms away from such activ-
ities. 112 Those individuals and firms most qualified to handle hazard-
ous wastes and most adept at preventing the occurrence of CERCLA 
violations would be driven out, leaving behind small, unsophisticated 
firms more likely to lack the capital and technological know-how 
necessary to ensure that hazardous wastes are handled properly. 113 
Finally, applying strict liability to officers will promote 
deterrence114 only if the officers in question are in positions to min-
imize the risks associated with the corporation's activities. Clearly, 
management, or permitting it to immunize itself, from the consequences of its negligence or 
misconduct"). 
111 Empirical evidence indicates that most investors are risk averse. See ABRAHAM, supra 
note 107, at 15 (noting that "[i]ndividuals and comparatively small businesses tend to be risk-
averse"); Note, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages, 
99 HARV. L. REV. 986,989 & n.23 (1986) (citing KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY 
OF RISK-BEARING 90-120 (1971)) ("most investors are risk averse when a large portion of 
their wealth is at stake"). In addition, "managers are inherently overinvested in the firm they 
serve," John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 
85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 17 (1986), and they, like investors, tend to be risk-averse. See Henry 
T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 
227, 320-22 (1990). 
112 See infra note 214 (discussing effect of personal liability upon officer behavior); cf. Cronk 
& Huddleston, supra note 4, at 690 ("A corporate officer faced with the prospect of being 
personally liable for violation of hazardous waste laws ... may choose to resign and seek 
employment in a less risky business. "). 
113 In fact, the cases imposing liability upon corporate individuals to date have all involved 
small, closely-held firms where one or a few individuals held multiple roles within the corpo-
ration and were intimately involved with the CERCLA violations in a number of ways. See, 
e.g., United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030, 1038 (E.D.N.C. 1989) 
(individuals personally liable were company's presidents, sole shareholder, and directors, and 
were in charge of day-to-day operations); United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 628 F. 
Supp. 391, 416-20 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (individual personally liable was president and majority 
stockholder, sole technical person, and controlled company's fiscal matters and strategic busi-
ness decisions); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 885-86 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (individual 
personally liable was president, chief operating officer, director, and majority stockholder). 
See also George W. Dent, Jr., Limited Liability in Environmental Law, 26 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 151, 175 (1991) (noting that evidence suggests that "an abnormally large number of 
firms with potential CERCLA liability [are] small and financially weak"). 
114 See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text (discussing deterrence rationale for strict 
liability). 
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not every officer is in such a position-it depends upon the officer's 
position and role within the corporate structure. Even if the officer 
is in a position to improve safety and minimize injuries, the officer 
already is obligated to undertake whatever measures are necessary 
or appropriate by virtue of his or her obligations and duties owed to 
the corporation and its shareholders.115 Imposition of strict liability 
under CERCLA will not, therefore, create a new duty for the cor-
porate officer to minimize environmental violations by the corpora-
tion, but will serve only to reinforce existing duties. 
The inappropriateness of applying the strict liability standard to 
corporate officers is best illustrated by an example. Assume that 
Officer Y, the vice-president and plant manager of Corporation X's 
widget manufacturing facility, exercises due care116 in hiring Li-
censed Waste Hauler, Inc. to take away hazardous wastes created 
in the widget production process. In loading the waste for transport 
to a licensed disposal site, Licensed Waste Hauler spills some of the 
hazardous substances on the ground beside Corporation X's loading 
dock. Five years later, the EPA discovers contamination in the 
vicinity of Corporation X's plant, and orders a cleanup action that 
ultimately will cost in excess of $5 million. As a "site or area where 
a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or 
placed, or otherwise came to be located,"117 Corporation X's plant is 
a "facility" for purposes of CERCLA.118 Moreover, a "release" of 
hazardous substances has undoubtedly occurred. 119 Who should be 
liable for the costs of cleaning up that facility? 
Under the terms of CERCLA, Corporation X is clearly liable for 
the cleanup costs. As the owner of the physical site, Corporation X 
is the "owner" of the "facility. "120 Thus, Corporation X is strictly 
liable under CERCLA for the cleanup costs incurred; its officer's 
115 See generally HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 8, §§ 231-42 (discussing duties of 
management). 
116 By due care, I mean that Officer Y has investigated Licensed Waste Hauler, Inc.'s 
reputation and safety record, has verified that the company is indeed properly licensed, and 
has taken whatever other steps a reasonable person would deem appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
117 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988) (quoted in supra note 25). 
118 See supra note 25 (discussing CERCLA's broad definition of "facility"). 
119 Courts have found that "releases" exist where hazardous substances are found in soil or 
groundwater samples. See, e.g., Washington v. Times Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Wash. 
1988); United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987). 
120 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(I) (1988) (quoted in supra note 28). 
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exercise of due care in selecting a licensed waste hauler to dispose 
of the product will not relieve the Corporation of liability. 121 
As a normative matter, holding Corporation X strictly liable for 
the cleanup costs is consonant with both the public policy objectives 
underlying traditional notions of strict liability and the statutory 
objectives of CERCLA. Corporation X captured the economic gains 
from the production activities leading to the creation of hazardous 
wastes; thus, fairness dictates that Corporation X pay for the harm 
created as a result of those activities. Moreover, forcing Corporation 
X to bear the costs of cleanup encourages the Corporation to raise 
the price of the widgets it creates to cover the additional liability, 
thus ensuring that societal resources will be allocated efficiently and 
social welfare maximized. 122 The increase in price resulting from 
increased liability will likewise ensure that the risk of harm resulting 
from the widget manufacturing process is spread among all the 
consumers of Corporation X's widgets. 123 The increased liability also 
creates an incentive for Corporation X to modify its production 
process to reduce the creation of hazardous wastes and to minimize 
the possibility for environmental harm. Finally, the strict liability 
scheme minimizes, in theory at least, the costs of litigating respon-
sibility for the ensuing harm. 124 
121 See supra note 39 (discussing limited defenses available under CERCLA). 
122 As a practical matter, the internalization of costs need not be captured solely in a price 
increase; the internalization could be reflected as well in decreased wages to workers or in 
decreased profits to the firm, or some combination thereof. 
123 As this example illustrates, risk-spreading is not a particularly strong rationale for 
CERCLA strict liability. Unlike the products liability or hazardous activities areas, where 
the injury falls upon one or a few victims, the injury of an unremedied environmental violation 
falls upon society as a whole, through either a polluted environment or through government 
funding of cleanup costs; thus, the risk is already spread. Placing the costs of the activity on 
the polluter does not serve to further spread the risks, although it does seem to contribute 
to distributive fairness. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text (discussing risk-spread-
ing rationale for strict liability). 
124 See Henderson, supra note 56, at 660-61 (noting that strict liability is often assumed to 
"entail[] comparatively lower administration costs" than negligence); but see STEVEN SHAV-
ELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 264 (1987) (noting that "the comparison of the 
size of administrative costs under [strict liability and negligence] is ambiguous as a theoretical 
matter"). Recent studies suggest that CERCLA's expansive liability scheme creates, rather 
than alleviates, transaction costs. See, e.g., William N. Hedeman et a!., Superfund Transac-
tion Costs: A Critical Perspective on the Superfund Liability Scheme, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. L. lnst.) 10,413, 10,414 (1991) (noting that "the high-stakes Superfund liability system 
breeds protracted negotiation and litigation, which in tum, entail significant [transaction] 
costs"). 
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More relevant to our inquiry, however, is the liability of Officer 
Y -the individual who manages the production facility and who se-
lected Licensed Waste Hauler, Inc. as a subcontractor. Should she 
be held strictly liable for cleanup costs, either as an "operator" of 
the facility125 or as a person who "arranged" for disposal?126 
The answer clearly is no. Officer Y does not capture the economic 
benefits of the production activity that led to the creation of the 
harm, nor will forcing her to bear the costs of cleanup result in an 
internalization of costs or an efficient allocation of societal resources. 
Officer Y is unable to spread the costs of the injury among the 
consumers of the widgets because she is unable to pass her liability 
through to the consumers in the form of a price increase as can 
Corporation X. Although the threat of personal liability may well 
stimulate Officer Y to take whatever measures are within her power 
to minimize the risk of environmental harm at the production facility, 
her ability to do so will be constrained by her position and authority 
within the corporate hierarchy. In this instance, where Officer Y 
already has exercised due care in hiring a licensed waste hauler to 
take the hazardous substances to a licensed disposal site, it is hard 
to imagine what further actions she should or could take to minimize 
the risk of harm. 
Imposing strict liability on Officer Y would not further the policies 
underlying strict liability. The courts have intuitively recognized that 
application of strict liability to an officer who acted neither inten-
tionally nor negligently, such as our fictitious Officer Y, would be 
onerous and overly broad. Nevertheless, when faced with clearly 
culpable officers, the courts have been unwilling to exonerate such 
individuals. Instead, they have struggled to find a method of impos-
ing liability upon corporate officers under the statutory language of 
CERCLA. Unfortunately, as the next subsection illustrates, the 
125 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(I) (1988) (quoted in note 28 supra). 
126 See id. § 9607(a)(3) (quoted in note 28 supra). The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co. (NE-
PACCO), 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), em. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987), held a vice-president 
individually liable under this section under similar facts, noting that the vice-president, "as 
plant supervisor, actually knew about, had immediate supervision over, and was directly 
responsible for arranging for the transportation and disposal of" the hazardous substances. 
[d. at 743. The court stated that "[i]t is the authority to control the handling and disposal of 
hazardous substances that is critical under the statutory scheme." [d. The only salient differ-
ence between NEPACCO and the instant example is that in NEPACCO, the vice-president 
had willfully authorized an illegal disposal of dioxin, whereas our fictitious Officer Y has acted 
without wrongful intent. Under a strict liability regime, however, Officer Y's lack of blame-
worthiness can have no effect on the outcome. 
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results of their struggle provide little comfort to those who find 
themselves in Officer Y's position. 
B. Current Standards of Officer Liability Under CERCLA 
No court has yet held a corporate officer strictly liable for the 
CERCLA violations of his or her corporation. Some courts have laid 
the groundwork for the development of such a standard, however, 
by analyzing corporate officer liability in the context of CERCLA's 
literal language. The reasoning that these courts offer has suggested 
that a corporate officer can be held individually liable for the cor-
poration's CERCLA violations merely by virtue of his or her status 
in the corporation. Careful analysis of the facts of the cases in which 
this type of language occurs indicates that mere status as an officer 
was not the sole factor at issue, but that rather, in virtually every 
instance, the officer had engaged in egregious behavior of a type 
that under traditional doctrine would lead ineluctably to individual 
liability. 127 
Although the outcomes of these cases may be satisfactory, the 
paths the courts have trod in getting there most certainly are not. 
PRPs are strictly liable under CERCLA. 128 By holding that an officer 
may be a PRP, the courts have opened the door to imposition of 
strict liability on officers. In deciding the specific cases before them, 
the courts have attempted to limit their holdings by applying one of 
three fault-based standards in determining whether an officer is 
considered a PRP: the personal participation theory,129 the control 
theorY,130 and the prevention theory.131 Each of these tests focuses 
upon the acts of the officer vis-a-vis the corporation's CERCLA 
violations and the degree of "fault" exhibited by the officer involved. 
However, the statute provides no basis for limiting the definition of 
PRP to a person who, through negligence or intentional act, was 
responsible for a CERCLA violation. Thus, none of the theories put 
forth by the courts adequately restricts the reach of CERCLA officer 
liability. 
127 See Oswald & Schipani, supra note 6, at 273; see also infra note 145 (discussing three 
cases that may be exceptions to this general rule). 
128 See supra note 38. 
129 See infra Section IV.B.l; see also Oswald & Schipani, supra note 6, at 275-82 (discussing 
cases applying personal participation theory). 
130 See infra Section IV.B.2; see also Oswald & Schipani, supra note 6, at 282-91 (discussing 
cases applying control theory). 
131 See infra Section IV.B.2; see also Oswald & Schipani, supra note 6, at 291-94 (discussing 
cases applying prevention test). 
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1. The Personal Participation Test 
CERCLA does not, by its language, require a finding of personal 
participation by the officer in the violation in order for the officer to 
be held individually liable. Nonetheless, a number of courts apply a 
"personal participation" test under CERCLA that stems from tra-
ditional tort and agency law principles: a corporate officer who per-
sonally participates in a CERCLA violation may be held individually 
liable for the harm resulting. 132 A few of the courts that have adopted 
this theory explicitly gTound the liability of the officers in traditional 
doctrine and not in CERCLA's language. 133 Others have purportedly 
based their results on CERCLA's statutory provisions, but have 
implicitly applied traditional tort and agency law notions in reaching 
their decisions. 134 
It is this latter group of cases that gives rise to concern. Although 
the net effect of the two approaches is the same-the officer is held 
liable because of his or her personal involvement in the acts leading 
to the CERCLA violation-their impacts on the development of 
132 See supra note 8 (discussing personal participation theory of traditional doctrine). 
133 See, e.g., United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030, 1038 (E.D.N.C. 
1989) (noting that "a corporate officer may be held individually liable for the torts of a 
corporation where the corporate officer participates in the tortious activity" and thus holding 
officers involved liable "under the common law tort theory of individual liability"). Carolina 
Transformer illustrates the doctrinal struggle that many courts undergo in this area for, in 
addition to holding the officers liable under traditional theory, the court evaluated factors 
such as "whether the person or corporation had the capacity to discover in a timely fashion 
the release or threat of release of hazardous substances; whether the person or corporation 
had the power to direct the mechanisms causing the release; and whether the person or 
corporation had the capacity to prevent and abate damages," id., in holding them liable as 
"operators" under CERCLA. See also United States v. Mottolo, 629 F. Supp. 56, 60 (D.N.H. 
1984) (noting that officer could be personally liable for arranging for disposal because "an 
officer of a corporation is liable for torts in which he personally participated, whether or not 
he was acting within the scope of his authority"); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 
1341-42 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (noting that "[al corporate officer may be held liable if he personally 
participates in the wrongful, injury-producing act," but finding that facts did not support 
imposition of liability in this instance). 
134 See, e.g., Riverside Market Dev. Corp. v. International Bldg. Prods., Inc., 931 F.2d 327, 
330 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that "CERCLA prevents individuals from hiding behind the 
corporate shield when, as 'operators,' they themselves actually participate in the wrongful 
conduct prohibited by the Act," and noting that "the extent of the defendant's personal 
participation in the alleged wrongful conduct" is key to determining liability); United States 
v. Bliss, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,879 (E.D. Mo. 1988) (holding personally liable 
officer who exercised his control or authority over waste disposal in such way as to result in 
CERCLA violations); United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 420 (W.D. 
Mo. 1986) (holding personally liable officer whose "high degree of personal involvement in the 
operation and decision-making process" of the corporation resulted in CERCLA violations); 
cf. United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 894 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (stating that "officer of a 
company who exercises authority for the company's operations and participates in arranging 
for the disposal of hazardous wastes" can be held personally liable as generator). 
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CERCLA doctrine are very different. A straightforward application 
of the traditional personal participation theory enables the court to 
reach the result Congress intended-holding a responsible party 
liable for cleanup costs-without undermining the traditional pro-
tections of tort and agency law, and without requiring the court to 
engage in twisted readings of CERCLA's statutory language. Ap-
plication of the traditional theory is independent of the statutory 
language of CERCLA and thus provides a more doctrinally pure 
approach to officer liability. 
When courts attempt to ground the personal participation stan-
dard in CERCLA's statutory language, however, the result is much 
less analytically sound. In holding officers statutorily liable as PRPs, 
as opposed to holding them liable under common law for their "per-
sonal participation" as evidenced by their affirmative acts of com-
mission or omission, these courts define PRP to include an officer 
whose negligent or intentional acts led to the corporation's CERCLA 
violation. By introducing a fault-based standard to define the scope 
of the term "PRP," these courts create a two-tiered system for 
determining liability that is contemplated by neither CERCLA's 
statutory language nor its legislative history. First, the officer must 
be found to have somehow "personally participated" in the events 
leading to the environmental contamination, in the sense that the 
officer must have engaged in negligent or intentional acts of com-
mission or omission that led to the CERCLA violation. Then, once 
the officer has been found to have so personally participated, he or 
she is labeled a PRP and held liable for cleanup costs under CER-
CLA's strict liability statutory scheme. 
The courts have not suggested that every violation of CERCLA 
by a corporation evidences personal participation by an officer of a 
type that should give rise to individual officer liability. For instance, 
in our example above, Officer Y did act affirmatively in hiring Li-
censed Waste Hauler, Inc., and that act did eventually lead to a 
CERCLA violation. The act of hiring a licensed carrier is not tor-
tious, however, and the cases clearly reflect judicial belief that only 
truly egregious tortious behavior by a corporate officer-such as 
active involvement in illegal disposaP35 or personal supervision over 
the contaminating practices136-should lead to individual liability. 137 
135 See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co. (NEPACCO), 579 F. 
Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), afi'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). 
136 See United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D.N.C. 1989). 
137 See generally Oswald & Schipani, supra note 6, at 275-82 (discussing cases applying 
personal participation theory). 
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As a practical matter, the courts have determined that the violation 
giving rise to officer liability must be one in which there is culpability 
on the part of the corporation and the officer. 138 
The most doctrinally sound way to reach this outcome would be 
to simply apply the personal participation theory of traditional tort 
and agency law doctrine directly, without attempting to frame it in 
terms of CERCLA's statutory language. There is nothing funda-
mentally inconsistent with holding the corporation strictly liable 
under CERCLA and simultaneously holding the officer liable under 
a common law fault-based standard where the facts support such 
individual liability, 139 nor can such a result be said to be inconsistent 
with the goals and objectives of CERCLA. Indeed, such a standard 
would actually promote the goals of CERCLA by ensuring that those 
held responsible are in fact those whose actions created the need for 
environmental cleanup. 
2. The Control and Prevention Tests 
If the courts' attempts to incorporate the traditional personal 
participation theory into CERCLA's statutory language are prob-
lematic, their two attempts to create new standards for determining 
liability are potentially disastrous. The control and prevention tests 
reflect judicial desire to effectuate the goals of CERCLA by ex-
138 See id. Both the retroactivity, see supra note 94, and the strict liability standard of 
CERCLA, see supra Section III.B, further complicate the analysis. Under traditional theory, 
an officer is held liable only where he or she committed affirmative acts that led to the tortious 
or illegal acts of the corporation. See supra note 8 (discussing personal participation theory 
of traditional doctrine). Ordinarily, violation of a statute is itself a tort. See, e.g., KEETON ET 
AL., supra note 43, § 36, at 230 (violation of statute is generally negligence per se). Logically, 
this would lead to the inference that an officer whose acts, even if intentional or negligent, 
led to a CERCLA violation should be personally liable because the violation itself is a tort. 
Because CERCLA is a strict liability statute, however, the corporation may be in violation 
even though it did not act intentionally or negligently. Rigid application of traditional theory 
would thus suggest that the officer too would be liable even though the officer did not commit 
an intentional or negligent act. Moreover, because CERCLA applies retroactively, see supra 
note 94, the officer could be held liable for affirmative acts taken in the past even though the 
act was in compliance with all then-applicable legal standards. Conceivably, an officer could 
be held strictly liable under CERCLA for actions taken in the past that were entirely legal 
at the time, but that are now illegal under CERCLA. Thus far, no court has reached this 
result, though certainly the potential for such a result exists. See Dale A. Oesterle, Viewing 
CERCLA as Creating an Option on the Marginal Firm: Does It Encourage Irresponsible 
Environmental Behavior?, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39, 47 n.27 (1991) ("Published case law 
on officer liability typically involves only officers who participated in dumping that was illegal 
at the time it occurred. Thus, prosecutors may, at present, be using good judgement in 
refusing to exercise the full power of the statute. "). 
139 This is, in fact, the result normally reached in the context of products liability. 
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panding officer liability beyond traditional notions to ensure that 
corporate officers who exercise control over hazardous waste activ-
ities or who occupy positions in the corporate structure that would 
enable them to mitigate or eliminate environmental harms be held 
individually liable for cleanup costs. Application of these standards 
again relies upon an interpretation of the categories of PRPs to 
include officers as well as the corporations that employ them. 
Courts applying the "control" theory hold liable those corporate 
officers who exercise control or authority over the corporation's 
hazardous waste disposal practices. 140 Although this theory is closely 
related to the personal participation theory in application, the rea-
soning underlying it is very different. The control theory focuses on 
the degree or type of control that the corporate officer exercises 
over the activities leading to the CERCLA violation,141 as opposed 
to the officer's actual involvement or participation in those activities. 
Every corporate action, however, is the result of a decision by a 
corporate officer who has the requisite control to decide whether the 
corporation should act or not act. 142 Thus, every corporate CERCLA 
violation ultimately can be traced back to an officer or officers whose 
140 See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d. Cir. 1985); United States 
v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D.N.C. 1989); United States v. Carolawn 
Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 29,699 (D. S.C. 1984). See generally Oswald & Schipani, 
supra note 6, at 282-91 (discussing cases). 
141 See, e.g., United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,699, 
20,700 (D.S.C. 1984) (noting that "to the extent that an individual has control or authority 
over the activities of a facility from which hazardous substances are released or participates 
in the management of such a facility, he may be held liable for response costs incurred at the 
facility notwithstanding the corporate character of the business"); United States v. Carolina 
Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030, 1037 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (noting that "dominant consider-
ation" in assessing personal liability against officers for CERCLA violations is their "significant 
participation in the running of the company, especially as it relates to waste disposal"); United 
States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742,748 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (holding corporate 
officer liable based not upon his status as corporate officer, but "because of his role in directing 
the handling of hazardous substances"). 
The legislative history contains some hints that Congress considered "control" to be a 
relevant issue in determining liability for CERCLA violations. Senate Report No. 848, for 
example, stated that strict liability would "create a compelling incentive for those in control 
of hazardous substances to prevent releases and thus protect the public from harm." S. REP. 
No. 848, supra note 15, at 14, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, vol. I, 
at 321 (emphasis added). A complete reading of the Report suggests, however, that the 
reference to "those in control" meant those corporations in control ofthe hazardous substances, 
and not those individual officers within the corporation who could control the corporation's 
hazardous waste practices. Indeed, my efforts unearthed no official discussion at all in the 
legislative history regarding the individual liability of corporate officers, other than the state-
ment of Peter Weiner, quoted in note 96 supra. 
142 Cf United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) ("the only way in which a 
corporation can act is through the individuals who act on its behalf"). 
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exercise of or failure to exercise decision-making authority, whether 
wrongful or not, resulted in the environmental degradation. CER-
CLA's strict liability standard provides no statutory mechanism for 
distinguishing among officers on these grounds-statutorily, the "re-
sponsible" officers would have to be held individually strictly liable 
in every instance. This would hold true even where the CERCLA 
violation resulted from legally and morally blameless behavior by 
the corporation. 
Thus, in our example of the fictitious Corporation X, Officer Y 
could be held strictly liable for cleanup costs under the control theory 
because she was the plant manager, she had the authority to control 
hazardous waste disposal activities, and she, in fact, exercised that 
control by hiring Licensed Waste Hauler, Inc. to remove the haz-
ardous substances. The fact that her actions in hiring a licensed 
hauler were in no way legally or morally culpable would be irrelevant 
to the imposition of liability, as would be the lack of legal or moral 
culpability on the part of the Corporation. 
Moreover, theoretically, mere possession of control, even in the 
absence of any affirmative act of commission or omission, could give 
rise to individual liability under this theory.143 As applied by the 
courts to date, however, the control test edges up against the per-
sonal participation test because courts look for actual control over 
hazardous waste practices;144 mere general managerial control over 
the corporation has been insufficient to support imposition of per-
sonalliability.145 In addition, in evaluating actual exercises of control 
143 The statements of some courts suggest that general managerial control is sufficient. See, 
e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985) (officer who is in 
charge of facility may be held liable as operator). The EPA has recently issued a rule rejecting 
this position in the context of lender liability. See infra note 200. 
144 Some courts have explicitly recognized this fact. See, e.g., United States v. Carolina 
Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030, 1037 (E.D.N.C. 1989) ("dominant consideration" in 
holding officers personally liable under CERCLA is their "significant participation in the 
running of the company, especially as it relates to waste disposal"); United States v. Carolawn 
Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 20,699, 20,700 (D.S.C. 1984) ("CERCLA contemplates 
personal liability of corporate officials ... who are responsible for the day-to-day operations of 
a hazardous waste disposal business."). 
145 For example, in United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. 
Mich. 1987), the court held personally liable a corporate president who admitted that he 
exercised responsibility for arranging for disposal of hazardous wastes. [d. at 747. The court 
noted that the president's "role in directing the handling of hazardous substances," not merely 
his status as a corporate officer, was key to his liability. [d. at 748. 
As Schipani and I discussed, however, three recent cases give rise to concern, not because 
the courts explicitly held the officers involved liable based upon their general managerial 
control, but because the courts failed to discuss the fact patterns underlying the cases, thus 
making it unclear whether the officers were personally involved in the environmental decision-
making of the firms. See Oswald & Schipani, supra note 6, at 289-90 (discussing Vermont v. 
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over hazardous waste practices, the courts have looked to wrongful 
exercises of or failures to exercise control. 146 Again, the courts are 
attempting to reach an intuitively "fair" result-of holding personally 
liable those individuals whose egregious actions led to the environ-
mental contamination. CERCLA, with its strict liability scheme, 
does not permit such exercises in leniency. 
If the courts were to apply the control theory to hold liable those 
parties who had general managerial control over the corporation, 
whether exercised or not, the control test would merge into the 
"prevention" theory. The prevention test is the newest to emerge in 
the CERCLA arena and was first articulated in Kelley v. ARGO 
Industries GOrp.147 in 1989. The prevention test focuses upon the 
officer's ability to prevent the harm from occurring rather than upon 
the individual's actual participation in the environmental violation or 
upon the individual's exercise of or failure to exercise control over 
hazardous substances disposal practices. 148 
Staco, 684 F. Supp. 822 (D. Vt. 1988), vacated in part on other grounds, No. 86-190 (D. Vt. 
Apr. 20, 1989) (1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17341); International Clinical Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Stevens, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,560 (E.D.N. Y. 1990); United States v. Mexico 
Feed & Seed Co., 764 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Mo. 1991». The fact that these courts found it 
unnecessary to address specifically the officers' level of personal involvement in the violations 
suggests that these courts may have already started down the slippery slope of strict officer 
liability. 
146 See, e.g., United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D.N.C. 1989) 
(officers held liable exercised day-to-day control over illegal PCB disposal); United States v. 
Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (officer held liable admitted 
responsibility for disposal of chemical wastes); see generally Oswald & Schipani, supra note 
6, at 282-91 (discussing cases). 
147 723 F. Supp. 1214 (W.D. Mich. 1989). Only one other court to date has adopted this test. 
See Quadion Corp. v. Mache, 738 F. Supp. 270, 274-75 (N.D. Ill. 1990). The United States 
District Court for the Western District of Michigan has restated the test on two occasions. 
See Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532, 1542-44 (W.D. Mich. 1989); Kelley v. 
Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1554, 1560-62 (W.D. Mich. 1989). 
148 Because of the lack of "a more definitive" statutory standard of liability, 723 F. Supp. at 
1219, the ARGO court articulated the following standard of personal liability for corporate 
officers: 
This Court will look to evidence of an individual's authority to control, among other 
things, waste handling practices~vidence such as whether the individual holds the 
position of officer or director, especially where there is a co-existing management 
position; distribution of power within the corporation, including position in the cor-
porate hierarchy and percentage of shares owned. Weighed along with the power 
factor will be evidence of responsibility undertaken for waste disposal practices, 
including evidence of responsibility undertaken and neglected, as well as affirmative 
attempts to prevent unlawful hazardous waste disposal. Besides responsibility ne-
glected, it is important to look at the positive efforts of one who took clear measures 
to avoid or abate the hazardous waste damage. 
Id. The court noted that the prevention test is "heavily fact-specific, requiring an evaluation 
of the totality of the situation." Id. at 1220. 
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In ARCO, the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Michigan acknowledged that CERCLA is a strict liability 
statute,149 yet it hesitated to apply that standard to corporate offi-
cers. Application of a strict liability standard to corporate officers 
would mean that officers would be held liable in every instance based 
merely upon their status in the corporation, a result the court found 
"too harsh and broad-sweeping. "150 Application of traditional tort 
and agency liability standards, on the other hand, would require a 
showing of "personal knowledge, direct supervision, or active par-
ticipation, "151 a standard that the court felt ignored the ability of an 
officer to prevent harm from occurring. In addition, the court was 
concerned that under the traditional test, affirmative acts to prevent 
harm from occurring could actually cause a defendant to be liable 
(by evidencing active participation in the activities leading to the 
CERCLA violation), rather than absolving that defendant of liabil-
ity.152 Thus, the court looked instead to the individual's position and 
authority within the company, the individual's responsibility for en-
vironmental practices, and the actions the individual took or did not 
take to prevent or minimize environmental harm. 153 
The ARCO court was the first court to recognize the dilemma that 
imposition of officer liability under CERCLA presents. Strict liabil-
ity is too onerous and oppressive a standard to apply to these indi-
viduals, particularly in the absence of any indication that Congress 
intended such a standard. Nonetheless, the ARCO court's articula-
tion of a new, intermediate standard has no basis in the statute. If 
we accept the premise that CERCLA is a strict liability statute, and 
that it applies to corporate officers, the only logical conclusion to be 
drawn is that corporate officers are strictly liable under CERCLA. 
The statute provides no room for the fault-based standard the ARCO 
court enunciated. 
C. Selecting the Correct Standard 
The three tests described above are judicial attempts to find a 
basis for corporate officer liability in CERCLA's statutory language. 
149Id. at 1219. 
150 Id. 
151 I d. at 1220. 
152Id. 
153 See id. at 1219 (quoted in note 148 supra). For an interesting argument that the preven-
tion test promotes economic efficiency, see Kathryn A. Heidt, Liability of Shareholders Under 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 
52 OHIO ST. L.J. 133, 172-73 (1991). 
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What the courts seem to ignore, however, is that nothing in CER-
CLA's language or legislative history indicates that Congress in-
tended that corporate officers be so liable. Broad legislative man-
dates that "responsible parties" be held liable for cleanup costs154 do 
not, without more, support the contention that Congress contem-
plated a dramatic departure from traditional doctrine to hold officers 
liable in the absence of culpable behavior. 
Moreover, from a policy viewpoint, imposition of such liability is 
untenable. If PRP status is based upon "control," even narrowly 
defined as control over environmental decision-making, then officers 
are potentially strictly liable for the CERCLA violations of their 
corporations. CERCLA is a strict liability statute, and nothing in 
its language permits exceptions from liability for corporate officers 
based upon their degree of fault or blameworthiness. Thus, under 
the statute, there is no way to distinguish between, say, a corporate 
officer who willfully authorized the illegal burial of leaking drums of 
hazardous waste and a corporate officer who authorized a licensed 
waste hauler to remove hazardous waste to a licensed disposal facil-
ity if the hauler then illegally disposed of that waste. 
This is not to say that a corporate officer should always be shielded 
from personal liability for the cleanup costs incurred by his or her 
corporation. Egregious behavior should lead to liability; however, 
that liability should be grounded in traditional doctrine, not in CER-
CLA's nebulous and inexact language. The personal participation 
theory of traditional agency and tort law doctrine already permits 
the imposition of personal liability in appropriate cases. 155 A corpo-
rate officer whose tortious behavior leads to a CERCLA violation 
can be held individually liable for the harm that results. Thus, an 
officer who willfully violates CERCLA provisions, as well as an 
officer who neglects his or her legal responsibility to ensure safe 
disposal of hazardous substances, can be held liable for the cleanup 
costs incurred. Courts need not try to incorporate the personal 
participation theory into CERCLA in order to apply it to corporate 
officers. Application of traditional tort and agency law doctrine is 
adequate to further the legislative goals of CERCLA; expansive 
readings of the statutory language are unnecessary. 
154 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 253(III), supra note 11, at 15, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 3038. 
155 See supra note 8 (discussing personal participation test). 
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V. LIABILITY STANDARDS FOR INDIVIDUAL SHAREHOLDERS 
UNDER CERCLA 
Limited liability is the keystone of American corporate law;156 
according to traditional analysis, shareholders invest in corpora-
tions precisely because their liability for the corporation's debts 
is limited to their contribution to capital. 157 Only in 
"exceptional circumstances"l58 and only where so required by 
156 See, e.g., Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chern. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 
1102 (5th Cir. 1973), modified per curiam, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974): 
Basic to the theory of corporation law is the concept that a corporation is a separate 
entity, a legal being having an existence separate and distinct from that of its owners. 
This attribute of the separate corporate personality enables the corporation's stock-
holders to limit their personal liability to the extent of their investment. . . . The 
corporate form, however, is not lightly disregarded, since limited liability is one of 
the principal purposes for which the law has created the corporation. 
See also HENN & ALEXANDER, supm note 8, § 73; Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of 
Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343, 343 (1947). 
157 See, e.g., Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corpomte Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 
573, 616 (1986) ("By accomplishing risk-shifting not created in the market place, limited liability 
encourages business managers to venture into activities that they would otherwise not un-
dertake."); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 93-101 (limited liability is an essential 
characteristic of publicly-held firm, and benefits both voluntary creditors and shareholders); 
Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corpomtions, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 
499, 502 (1976) ("[U]nlimited liability would discourage investment in business ventures by 
individuals who wanted to make small, passive investments in such ventures. It would also 
discourage even substantial entrepreneurial investments by risk-averse individuals .... "). As 
stated by the Fifth Circuit: 
Under the doctrine of limited liability, the owner of a corporation is not liable for the 
corporation's debts. Creditors of the corporation have recourse only against the 
corporation itself, not against its parent company or shareholders. It is on this 
assumption that "large undertakings are rested, vast enterprises are launched, and 
huge sums of capital attracted." 
United States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686,690 (5th Cir. 1985), cm. denied, 475 U.S. 
1014 (1986) (citations omitted). 
158 1 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPO-
RATIONS § 41.10, at 614-15 ("[T]he imposition of liability notwithstanding the corporate shield 
is to be exercised reluctantly and cautiously. Some courts speak of disregard of the corporate 
entity as requiring exceptional circumstances.") (footnotes omitted). Courts generally consider 
the following types of factors in evaluating whether the corporate form should be ignored: 
(1) undercapitalization of a one-man corporation, (2) failure to observe corporate 
formalities, (3) nonpayment of dividends, (4) siphoning of corporate funds by the 
dominant stockholder, (5) nonfunctioning of other officers or directors, (6) absence of 
corporate records, (7) the use of the corporation as a facade for operations of the 
dominant stockholder or stockholders, and (8) the use of the corporate entity in 
promoting injustice or fraud. 
Ramsey v. Adams, 603 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979); see also 1 FLETCHER, supm, 
§ 41.30, at 661-66 (corporate form will be disregarded when used to "defeat public convenience, 
justify wrong. . .or perpetrate fraud or other reprehensible conduct"); David H. Barber, 
Piercing the Corpomte Veil, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 371, 373-75 (1981) (discussing judicial 
rationales for piercing). 
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equity159 will the courts pierce the corporate veil and hold the share-
holders personally liable for the corporation's debts and liabilities. l60 
169 See, e.g., Irwin & Leighton, Inc. v. W.M. Anderson Co., 532 A.2d 983, 987 (Del. Ch. 
1987) ("The protection offered by the corporate fonn, however, is not absolute; equity has 
long acted to extend a corporate liability to those in control of the corporation in appropriate 
circumstances. "). 
160 A significant body of literature has developed in recent years urging the abolition of 
limited liability for shareholders. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward 
Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991) (concluding 
that shareholders of both publicly-held and closely-held corporations should be subjected to 
unlimited liability for corporate torts); Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited 
Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 148-49 (1980) (concluding that limited 
liability regime is appropriate for large, widely-held corporations, but that unlimited liability 
regime is appropriate for closely-held corporations); Christopher D. Stone, The Place of 
Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1, 65-76 (1980) 
(limited liability of shareholders for debts to involuntary shareholders undennines compen-
sation of victims and makes mockery of deterrence). Commentators have postulated that 
limited liability poses several advantages, such as insulating absentee investors from exposure 
to risk, permitting diversification of portfolios, minimizing agency and collection costs, pro-
moting efficiency in the marketplace, eliminating the expense of contracting around liability, 
and encouraging risk-taking. See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: 
SUBSTANTIVE LAW § 4.02 (1987) (summarizing arguments for limited liability). Other com-
mentators have criticized limited liability, arguing that it creates unfairness and inefficiency 
for tort and other involuntary creditors and for labor claimants, encourages excessively risky 
investments, results in increased infonnation and monitoring costs, and impairs the efficiency 
of the marketplace. Id. § 4.03 (summarizing arguments against limited liability). Thus, many 
of the arguments for unlimited shareholder liability mimic those in favor of strict liability. For 
example, commentators have argued that limited liability deprives defendants of economic 
incentives to be prudent and thus results in more negligence than would occur if liability were 
unlimited. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 113, at 165; Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Cor-
porate Structure and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 
J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 706-14 (1985). "Limited liability also causes allocative distortions by 
'encourag[ing] investment in inefficient ventures' and stimulating excessive investment in 
industries that escape the costs of accidents they cause." Dent, supra note 113, at 168 (quoting 
Note, supra note 111, at 989). 
Even though it seems highly improbable that the law will abandon limited liability of 
shareholders at any time in the near future, the theory of unlimited shareholder liability 
provides a useful analogy for the purposes of this Article. Indeed, unlimited shareholder 
liability can be viewed as a fonn of blanket strict liability. Although commentators speak in 
tenns of subjecting the shareholders to "unlimited liability" for the negligent or intentional 
torts of their corporation, the net effect of that action would be to hold the shareholders 
strictly liable for those torts. Determinations of fault would be made at the level of the 
corporation's actions and would be irrelevant at the level of the shareholder. 
Many of the commentators writing in this field distinguish between limited liability in the 
contract context and limited liability in the tort context, arguing that limited liability is less 
justifiable in tort actions, which involve "involuntary creditors," than in contract claims, which 
involve "voluntary" creditors. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra, at 1919-20; David 
W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1604-
05 (1991). Commentators disagree on whether courts are more likely to pierce the corporate 
veil in the contract context or the tort context. Compare Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 
8, at 112 ("Courts are more willing to disregard the corporate veil in tort than in contract 
cases.") with HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 8, § 146, at 348 ("[c]ourts usually cite contract 
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CERCLA manifests congressional intent that those "responsible" 
for the contamination pay for its cleanup. 161 This statement, standing 
alone, hardly indicates that Congress intended that CERCLA over-
ride the traditional protections of the corporate form in order to hold 
shareholders personally liable for the CERCLA violations of their 
corporations in every instance. Nothing in CERCLA's language sup-
ports imposition of strict liability upon individual shareholders. 
Moreover, an examination of the policies underlying traditional no-
tions of limited liability reveals that imposition of strict liability upon 
the shareholders of a corporation that has violated CERCLA would 
not further CERCLA's statutory goals. 
The courts, in fact, have not held individual shareholders strictly 
liable in their role as shareholders for the cleanup costs imposed 
upon their corporations. Rather, it would appear that every case 
imposing liability upon a shareholder to date has involved an active 
shareholder of a closely-held corporation. 162 In each case, the indi-
vidual's liability can more appropriately be traced to his or her 
actions undertaken in his or her role as an officer or an employee of 
the firm.163 The courts have failed to make clear, however, the dis-
tinction between holding the individual liable as an "owner" in his 
or her role as a shareholder, and holding the same individual per-
sonally liable for activities undertaken in his or her role as a corpo-
rate officer. The careless language and reasoning that these courts 
offer creates the impression that shareholders can indeed be held 
and tort cases indiscriminately as precedents"); and Stone, supra, at 69 n.261 ("[W]hile social 
policy would seem to support piercing the corporate veil to establish investor liability more 
in tort. . . than in contract, the doctrine of 'piercing' seems to operate more on behalf of 
voluntary ... creditors."); and Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical 
Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1058 (1991) (empirical analysis indicates "that courts pierce 
more often in the contract context than in tort"). At least one court has explicitly denied the 
existence of any such distinction in the context of CERCLA. See In re Acushnet River & 
New Bedford Harbor Proceedings: Re Alleged PCB Pollution, 675 F. Supp. 22, 31-32 (D. 
Mass. 1987). 
Liability under CERCLA is more akin to the tort situation, where the injured party is 
involuntarily forced into an unwanted relationship and has no bargaining power to alter the 
governing liability rules. Society does not contract voluntarily with a defendant for environ-
mental contamination, and is not able to negotiate for a better position in advance of the harm 
arising. 
161 See supra note 11. 
162 See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States 
v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D.N.C. 1989); United States v. Bliss, 20 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 20,879 (E.D. Mo. 1988); United States v. Northernaire Plating 
Co., 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. 
Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1986); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884 (E.D.N.C. 1985). 
163 See id.; see generally Oswald & Schipani, supra note 6, at 297. 
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strictly liable in their role as shareholders, and sets the stage for 
future expansion of CERCLA liability beyond that contemplated by 
Congress. 
A. Application of the Strict Liability Standard to Shareholders 
There may be some validity to the argument that imposing strict 
liability upon shareholders would promote fairness. Even though the 
shareholders might well be as blameless as the victim in any given 
scenario of environmental contamination, they capture the benefits 
of the corporation's activities through their claim on corporate prof-
its, and thus, arguably, they should bear the costs of those activi-
ties. l64 Shareholders do bear those costs, however, at least to the 
extent of their investment in the firm. The question is whether 
notions of fairness should override the traditional limits on share-
holder liability so as to render these parties responsible for cleanup 
costs exceeding their contribution to the firm's capital. Corporations 
are created under state statutory law and their activities generally 
are regulated at that level, not at the federal level. 165 While the 
federal government has the power to preempt conflicting state leg-
islation,166 normally the courts look for signs of explicit congressional 
intent to do so before finding that preemption exists. 167 Nothing in 
CERCLA's sparse statutory language nor in its muddled legislative 
history would indicate that Congress intended CERCLA to negate 
traditional notions of corporate form and shareholder obligations. l68 
164 Commentators have addressed this issue in the context of unlimited shareholder liability. 
See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (discussing fairness rationale for strict liability). 
165 See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) ("Corporations are creatures of state 
law .... "); 1 FLETCHER, supra note 158, § 2.55 at 254 ("The internal affairs of corporations 
are to be governed by state law unless federal law expressly provides otherwise because 
corporations are creators of state law. ") (footnote omitted). 
166 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
167 See Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n., Inc. v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 
U.S. 461, 469 (1984) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (citations omitted)): 
First, in enacting the federal law, Congress may explicitly define the extent to which 
it intends to pre-empt state law. Second, even in the absence of express pre-emptive 
language, Congress may indicate an intent to occupy an entire field of regulation, in 
which case the States must leave all regulatory activity in that area to the Federal 
Government. Finally, if Congress has not displaced state regulation entirely, it may 
nonetheless pre-empt state law to the extent that the state law actually conflicts 
with federal law. Such a conflict arises when compliance with both state and federal 
law is impossible, or when the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 
168 See Audrey J. Anderson, Note, Corporate Life After Death: CERCLA Preemption of 
State Corporate Dissolution Law, 88 MICH. L. REV. 131, 133-35 (1989) (discussing CERCLA's 
preemption language and legislative history). 
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Forcing shareholders to bear strict liability for the injuries that 
their firms' activities inflict will not further the economic efficiency 
goals of internalization of costs. Costs borne by shareholders are not 
equivalent to costs borne by the corporation itself; shareholders, like 
the officers discussed above,169 lack a mechanism to ensure that the 
liability they incur will be passed along to the firm's customers 
through increased prices. 170 Because the corporation remains strictly 
liable under CERCLA regardless of whether the shareholders are 
held so liable, the corporation already has an incentive for treating 
cleanup costs as a production cost and thus for reflecting those costs 
in the pricing of its goods or services. Therefore, holding sharehold-
ers strictly liable in addition to holding the corporation so liable does 
not promote efficient resource allocation or maximization of social 
welfare. 
As a practical matter, imposition of strict liability upon sharehold-
ers would do little to foster the spreading of risk. In a closely-held 
corporation, the small number of shareholders will make significant 
risk-spreading difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. In the context 
of a publicly-held corporation with numerous shareholders, imposi-
tion of strict liability upon the shareholders for the corporation's 
CERCLA violations might result in some spreading of risk. If each 
individual shareholder were required to bear a pro rata share of the 
costs of cleanup, for example, those costs would be spread over a 
larger group of persons, although such "risk-spreading" is still rel-
atively narrow. As noted above, however, the costs of the liability 
risks borne by the corporation are already reflected in the prices of 
the goods.171 Extending that liability to shareholders merely accom-
plishes limited risk-spreading in the situation in which actual liabil-
ities exceed the projected liabilities reflected in price. 172 
169 See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing inability of officers to internalize 
costs). 
170 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (discussing free market pricing mecha-
nism). 
171 See id. 
172 Cj. Schwartz, supra note 160, at 729: 
The loss-spreading justification for strict liability cannot support remote risk im-
positions because firms will not spread the losses associated with remote risks. Firms 
spread losses by insuring against them and reflecting premium costs in their prices. 
Because firms are ignorant of remote risks, they do not insure them fully. Conse-
quently, when these risks materialize a court's choices are limited to letting the 
resultant costs lie or ordering direct wealth transfers from a firm's shareholders to 
plaintiffs. Neither outcome produces loss spreading. 
Id. Schwartz defines a "remote risk" as "the risk that a product is more dangerous than a 
firm would predict if it had done the cost-effective amount of research into safety." Id. at 691. 
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In addition, imposition of liability upon shareholders raises the 
question of how that liability should be apportioned-on a pro rata 
or a joint and several basis. Both methods are problematic. The 
logistical difficulties and high transaction costs associated with col-
lecting pro rata shares from large numbers of shareholders would 
likely prove insurmountable.173 Although these problems could be 
minimized by imposing joint and several liability against individual 
shareholders,174 the risk-spreading attributes of pro rata liability 
would be lost as a result. 175 
Finally, holding shareholders individually strictly liable for their 
corporation's CERCLA violations is unlikely to promote the deter-
rence that proponents of strict liability commonly seek. In a publicly-
held firm with hundreds or thousands of shareholders, the ability of 
anyone shareholder to affect corporate decision-making processes 
through the shareholder ballot box is necessarily weak. Individual 
shareholders cannot minimize the harm that results from the cor-
poration's actions, nor are they in a position to influence the corpo-
ration's day-to-day activities. 176 To have any effect at all on corporate 
173 See, e.g., Leebron, supra note 160, at 1611 ("The transaction costs of collecting the pro 
rata shares against typical individual shareholders would in almost every case be so high that 
it would not be worth it."); but see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 160, at 1900-01 
(arguing that collection costs would not be prohibitive because courts could administer collec-
tion effort, just as bankruptcy trustees currently collect hundreds or thousands of accounts 
receivables; further, insurers would likely offer portfolio insurance to risk-averse sharehold-
ers). See generally BLUMBERG, supra note 160, § 4.05.1 (discussing imposition of pro rata 
liability on shareholders). 
174 Joint and several liability would be a more logical choice than pro rata liability because 
CERCLA is a joint and several liability statute. See Valder, supra note 36, at 2079-81. 
175 Information costs would rise as shareholders sought increased information about the 
wealth and financial status of their fellow investors. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 
8, at 95. 
176 Shareholders' control over policy matters or long-term corporate objectives essentially 
is limited to their ability to vote for the board of directors. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 141(a) (1983) ("business and affairs" of corporation "shall be managed by or under the 
direction of a board of directors"); see generally HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 8, ch. 9(D) 
(discussing rights and duties of shareholders). Hansmann and Kraakman argue that unlimited 
shareholder liability would actually result in greater incentives to management to avoid tort 
liability because shareholders faced with contingent tort liability would demand, and managers 
would supply, more data regarding the riskiness of corporate policies because this data would 
affect share pricing. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 160, at 1907. Even if this were so 
(and I am not yet convinced that it is), it does not affect the discussion of whether shareholders 
should be strictly liable for CERCLA liabilities of their corporations. If firms are subjected 
to unlimited shareholder liability for all types of torts, the prices of the shares of all firms 
will be affected in the same manner. If shareholders are only subjected to liability for the 
environmental debts of their firms, however, the result will be a fundamental shift in the 
marketplace for shares of corporations whose activities are more likely to give rise to envi-
ronmental liability. 
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environmental policy, many, if not most, of the shareholders would 
have to act in concert to influence the board. 177 
Even in a closely-held firm, where the shareholders generally 
possess greater control over corporate management, imposing strict 
liability on shareholders is unlikely to promote deterrence. Because 
the corporation itself is strictly liable, all of the firm's assets, and 
thus all of the shareholders' investment, are already at stake. It is 
unclear why this substantial liability should not provide adequate 
incentive to discourage environmentally risky activities. Moreover, 
a shareholder's liability is limited by the extent of his or her personal 
assets; imposition of strict liability upon these individuals will simply 
encourage investment in environmentally risky firms by less wealthy 
individuals. 178 Thus, imposition of strict liability upon shareholders 
of closely-held firms would pressure those individuals into either 
undertaking a more active role in the corporation's management that 
would allow them to influence company policy and guard against 
environmental harm,179 or into divesting their ownership interest. 18o 
Holding shareholders strictly liable for the CERCLA violations of 
their corporations would fundamentally alter traditional notions of 
shareholder liability, and would work substantial changes on share-
holder investment patterns. Imposition of either pro rata or joint 
and several liability would undoubtedly throw the financial market 
into disarray181 as shareholders sought to divest themselves of stock 
177 Even then the ability of the shareholder of a large corporation to effect change is 
relatively minimal. The courts have implicitly recognized this fact, and have declined to pierce 
the corporate veil to hold shareholders of publicly-held corporations individually liable in any 
context. See Thompson, supra note 160, at 1047. 
178 See SHAVELL, supra note 124, at 182 ("Under strict liability, injurers will take no care 
if their assets are sufficiently low. They will take a positive and increasing level of care as 
their assets rise, but their level of care will be suboptimal as long as their assets are less than 
the losses they might cause."); Susan E. Woodward, Limited Liability in the Theory of the 
Firm, 141 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 601, 602 (1985) (if shares are freely 
transferable and shareholders are subject to personal liability for corporate debts, in threat 
of bankruptcy, wealthy shareholders would have incentive to sell their shares to individuals 
with few or no assets worth pursuing). 
179 Cf. Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. 
REV. 80, 102 (1991) ("Without limited liability, all owners would be forced to either take an 
active role in management or to suffer severe consequences from poor management deci-
sions."). 
180 In the context of a closely-held firm, this could prove difficult, if not impossible. The 
market for shares of closely-held corporations is often very limited. Moreover, restrictions 
may have been placed upon transfer of the stock to prevent it from passing from the hands 
of a narrowly defined group of persons. 
181 Cf. Woodward, supra note 178, at 601 ("[T]he most important feature of limited liability 
is that it accommodates transferable shares. Any extension of liability beyond the assets of 
the firm to the personal (extra-firm) assets of the shareholders must, in order to be enforceable, 
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in industries likely to give rise to large potential individual liability 
for CERCLA violations. 182 Most likely, imposition of strict liability 
on shareholders would cause risk-averse individuals to divest and 
reinvest in other, "safer," firms, i. e., firms whose activities posed 
less risk of environmental contamination. 183 This result may be pref-
erable in the context of firms whose egregious activities or poor 
technological processes create the potential for severe and unnec-
essary environmental harm because the forces of the financial market 
would discourage these firms from continuing their risky practices. 
The strict nature of CERCLA liability means, however, that, be-
cause of the risk of financial ruin, shareholders will also be discour-
aged from investing in activities that are undeniably socially bene-
ficial. Even a business as commonplace and as socially necessary as 
a gas station poses a risk of environment contamination because of 
leaking underground tanks or spilled fuel. 184 If shareholders are faced 
with strict liability even where the corporation has acted carefully 
and reasonably in every way, they will be hesitant to invest in firms 
of this type. 185 
impair transferability of shares. "); Ribstein, supra note 179, at 99-100 ("Limited liability is a 
necessary condition of market efficiency because it facilitates free transferability of shares 
and pricing of shares according to expected cash flows. "); but see Hansmann & Kraakman, 
supra note 160, at 1895-99 (arguing that rule of unlimited liability could be drafted that would 
not impair the marketability of securities), 1903-04 (arguing that while joint and several 
liability would distort market for shares, pro rata liability would not). Thompson suggests 
that the courts have recognized the potential burden that unlimited liability could present to 
the securities market, and have acted accordingly: "The willingness [of the judiciary] to 
sometimes hold shareholders of close corporations liable, but never shareholders of public 
corporations, suggests that limited liability's positive role in facilitating the public market for 
shares is strong enough to overcome any justification for piercing." Thompson, supra note 
160, at 1070-7l. 
182 Some commentators have argued that if the objective is simply to spread the costs over 
as large a group as possible, it would make more sense to have the costs of cleanup borne by 
the government, which is, after all, the ultimate risk-spreader. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 
113, at 174 ("The federal government is a better risk-spreader than even the largest firm."). 
183 See Note, supra note 111, at 989 ("most investors are risk averse when a large portion 
of their wealth is at stake") (footnote omitted). See also supra note 111 (discussing risk 
aversion of investors). 
184 See generally John A. Chanin, Comment, LUST on Your Corner: Strict Liability, Victim 
Compensation, and Leaking Underground Storage Tanks, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 365 (1991). 
185 See, e.g., Korhonen & Smith, supra note 4, at 315-16 (broad CERCLA liability chills 
certain types of transactions within chemical and waste industries); Perry E. Wallace, Jr., 
Liability of Corporations and Corporate Officers, Directors, and Shareholders Under Super-
fund: Should Corporate and Agency Law Concepts Apply?, 14 J. CORP. L. 839, 842 (1989) 
(broad judicial interpretations of CERCLA liability have created "uncertainties and fears" 
that "unnecessarily diminish the affected industries' contributions to certain basic economic 
and business functions in society"); Rallison, supra note 4, at 622-23 (broad judicial interpre-
tations of CERCLA liability alter investment and divestment patterns in certain industries). 
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Returning to our earlier example of the fictitious Corporation X, 
let us assume that the Corporation is owned equally by two individ-
uals. Shareholder Z receives annual dividends and votes for the 
board of directors, but has no other connection with the management 
or operation of the firm. Shareholder/Officer Y, on the other hand, 
is actively involved in the management and day-to-day operation of 
the firm as an officer and director. Assume further that Corporation 
X, with the full knowledge and active participation of Shareholderl 
Officer Y, illegally dumps toxic wastes on the ground outside of the 
Corporation's plant. Eventually, this results in an EPA-ordered 
cleanup under CERCLA. The EPA seeks to hold Shareholders Y 
and Z individually liable. 
Should these two individuals be held strictly liable for cleanup 
costs because of their status as shareholders of Corporation X? 
Clearly not. Accurate analysis of this issue depends upon making a 
careful distinction between holding these individuals liable as "own-
ers" and holding them liable as "operators"-a distinction the courts 
have been noticeably lax in drawing. 186 The basis for liability under 
these two categories is quite different: the term "owner" implies 
that liability can be based solely upon status as an owner, even in 
the absence of actual participation in the environmental practices or 
management of the facility, while the term "operator" indicates some 
degree of involvement in those activities. 187 
Neither of these terms can properly be applied to shareholders. 
First, while the courts have failed to focus on whether a PRP must 
be the owner of the corporation that owns the facility or the owner 
of the facility itself,188 CERCLA itself is quite clear in stating that 
ownership or operation of the facility is key to establishing liabil-
186 See Heidt, supra note 153, at 174-75 (noting that over one-half of courts have confused 
tenus "owner" and "operator"); Oswald & Schipani, supra note 6, at 300 ("[A]lthough an 
individual may be liable under CERCLA as either an owner or an operator, courts typically 
connect the tenus as a single phrase--'owner or operator'-and fail to distinguish between 
the grounds supporting the imposition of liability upon the two categories of potentially 
responsible parties. "). 
187 See Heidt, supra note 153, at 155. The courts have begun to recognize this distinction in 
the parent corporation context. See, e.g., United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 
27 (1st Cir. 1990) (characterizing operator liability as direct liability based upon parent's own 
activities, as opposed to activities of its subsidiary, while owner liability is indirect liability 
that falls under traditional corporate law doctrines, such as piercing of corporate veil), cen. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991); Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Eppinger & Russell Co., 776 F. 
Supp. 1542 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (using different standards to evaluate parent's liability as owner 
versus as operator); John Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 775 F. Supp. 435 (D. Mass. 1991) 
(same). 
186 See Heidt, supra note 153, at 155. 
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ity.l89 A shareholder of a firm is an owner of the corporation, which 
in turn is the owner of the facility giving rise to CERCLA liability. 
The shareholder has no property interest in the facility, only in the 
corporation itself; thus, the shareholder is not an "owner" of the 
facility. 190 Absent a piercing of the corporate veil,191 therefore, share-
holders cannot be held liable under CERCLA as "owners." 
Second, shareholders cannot be held liable under CERCLA as 
"operators." It is impossible for a shareholder to engage in behavior 
that would lead to that individual being held liable as an "operator" 
under CERCLA. Shareholders are, by definition, investors in the 
firms and their authority is limited to electing the board of directors 
and voting on major corporate actions; they have no ability to engage 
in day-to-day management of the firm, its operations, or its hazard-
ous waste practices. 192 
Does this mean that Shareholder/Officer Y, who has undeniably 
engaged in egregious and illegal behavior, escapes all liability for his 
actions? Certainly not. He can be held personally liable under the 
personal participation theory discussed above193 because of his affir-
mative acts of commission or omission in the activities that led to 
the CERCLA violation. This liability is based upon his actions under-
taken in his role as an officer of the firm, however, not upon his 
status as a shareholder. 194 
Although courts that have analyzed analogous situations in the 
past have reached essentially this same outcome, they have failed 
189 See 42 u.s.c. § 9607(a) (1988) (quoted in note 28 supra). 
190 The Fifth Circuit explicitly recognized this point in Riverside Market Dev. Corp. v. 
International Bldg. Prods., Inc., 931 F.2d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 1991) (individual's position as 
majority stockholder in the corporation that purchased the facility did not make him an owner 
of the facilities because '''[t]he property of the corporation is its property, and not that of the 
stockholders, as owners"') (quoting 1 FLETCHER, supra note 158, § 31 at 555), cert. denied, 
112 S. Ct. 636 (1991). See also HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 8, § 71 (shareholders do not 
own assets of corporation, although they may exercise limited control over those assets); 
Heidt, supra note 153, at 174 ("A shareholder of a corporation which owns the facility, is not 
an 'owner' of the facility-unless the corporate veil is pierced."); Oswald & Schipani, supra 
note 6, at 299 ("Shareholders are investors in the corporation engaging in hazardous waste 
activities; the corporation itself is the 'owner' of the facility. "). 
191 See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text (discussing piercing doctrine). 
192 See supra note 176 (discussing rights of shareholders). See also Oswald & Schipani, supra 
note 6, at 299-300 ("[A]s a practical matter, it is impossible for an individual acting solely in 
his or her capacity as a shareholder to be an 'operator' of a facility. Shareholders merely hold 
ownership interests in the corporation, collect distributions, elect directors, and vote on major 
corporate actions."). 
193 See supra Section IV.B.1 (discussing application of personal participation test to officers). 
194 Shareholder Z, as a passive shareholder, occupies no such position within the corporate 
hierarchy, and so could not be held liable under this theory. 
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to carefully distinguish between holding active shareholders liable 
as officers and holding them liable as shareholders. 195 Only by clari-
fying that individuals such as Shareholder/Officer Yare liable in 
their capacity as officers, not shareholders, can the courts ensure 
that legal rules are not articulated that would inappropriately hold 
passive shareholders, such as Shareholder Z, liable in their capacity 
as owners of the corporation that owns or operates the facility. 
B. Current Standards of Shareholder Liability Under CERCLA 
No court has yet attempted to hold an individual shareholder 
strictly liable as an "owner" for the CERCLA violations of the 
corporation in which that shareholder held stock. Nonetheless, a 
number of CERCLA opinions indicate that shareholders can, and 
should, be held personally liable for the CERCLA violations of their 
corporation. 196 Although the courts have failed to acknowledge this 
fact explicitly, the key to understanding these opinions is that each 
of these individuals was an active shareholder in a closely-held cor-
poration. The liability of these individuals was based upon their 
actions undertaken in their roles as corporate officers, not their 
status as shareholders. The courts have never held liable under 
CERCLA a shareholder who was not also an employee or officer of 
the corporation committing the CERCLA violation, and who was 
not somehow actively involved in the activities that led to that 
violation. 
Generally, courts have relied upon the statutory definitions of 
section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA in holding shareholders individually 
liable for their corporations' environmental violations. 197 This section 
specifically excludes from the definition of "owner and operator" any 
person "who, without participating in the management of ... a 
195 See infra note 196 and accompanying text (collecting cases). 
196 See e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States 
v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D.N.C. 1989); United States v. Bliss, 20 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 20,879 (E.D. Mo. 1988); United States v. Northernaire Plating 
Co., 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884 (E.D.N.C. 
1985); United States v. Conservation Chern. Co. 628 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1986); United 
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co. (NEPACCO), 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. 
Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 
(1987). See generally Oswald & Schipani, supra note 6, at 297-301 (discussing cases involving 
individual shareholder liability). 
197 But see United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988) (corporate veil pierced 
to hold active shareholder individually liable) (discussed in Oswald & Schipani, supra note 6, 
at 297-98). 
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... facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his secu-
rity interest in the ... facility."198 Congress designed this provision 
to ensure that secured creditors did not become liable for their 
debtors' CERCLA violations. 199 Several courts have held, however, 
that the logical antithesis of this exception is that persons who do 
hold indicia of ownership and who do participate in the management 
of the firm-Le., active shareholders-are liable as owners or op-
erators.200 To find otherwise, in the words of one court, "would 
frustrate congressional purpose by exempting from the operation of 
the Act a large class of persons who are uniquely qualified to assume 
the burden imposed" by CERCLA.201 
198 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). 
199 See H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 36, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 15, vol. II, at 546 (secured creditor exception was designed to protect 
financial institutions that "hold title either in order to secure a loan or in connection with a 
lease financing arrangement under the appropriate banking laws, rules, or regulations"). 
200 See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985) ("The use 
of this exception implies that an owning stockholder who manages the corporation .. .is liable 
under CERCLA as an 'owner or operator.'''); NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 848 ("The statute 
literally reads that a person who owns interest [sic] in a facility and is actively participating 
in its management can be held liable for the disposal of hazardous waste."), aff'd in part, 
rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States V. 
Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,995 (E.n. Pa. 1985) ("Courts have 
generally concluded that the exemption from liability gives rise to an inference that an 
individual who owns stock in a corporation and who actively participates in its management 
can be held liable for clean up costs incurred as a result of improper disposal by the corpo-
ration."). 
Although a recent rule issued by the EPA regarding the liability of secured creditors, see 
57 Fed. Reg. 18382 (Apr. 29, 1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100), does not address 
shareholder corporation liability, it does address an analogous issue: the liability of secured 
creditors as owners or operators under CERCLA when property in which they hold a security 
interest is contaminated with hazardous substances. The rule is intended to relieve the 
uncertainty felt by lending institutions after the Ninth Circuit held in United States V. Fleet 
Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991), that a creditor 
could be held liable under CERCLA if the extent of the creditor's participation in the financial 
management of the debtor's business indicated that the creditor had the capacity to influence 
the debtor's treatment of hazardous waste. The rule defines the key provisions of the secured 
creditor exemption found in CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(1988). 
The rule specifically provides that the "mere capacity to influence, or ability to influence, 
or the unexercised right to control facility operations" does not constitute participation in the 
management of the facility. 57 Fed. Reg. at 18383. Rather, participation in management for 
purposes of § 101(20)(A) consists of the exercise of decision-making control over the debtor's 
environmental compliance, or exercise of control over the overall day-to-day decision-making 
of the enterprise with respect to either environmental compliance or substantially all of the 
operational aspects of the enterprise. [d. It could be argued by analogy that shareholder 
liability likewise should be based upon actual exercise of control, as opposed to mere capacity 
to control. It is too early to tell, however, what position the EPA or the courts will take on 
this issue. 
201 NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 848-49 (citing Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 
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This argument fails to hold up upon close examination. As noted 
above , 202 a shareholder holds indicia of ownership in the corporation 
itself, not the facility. A secured creditor, on the other hand, does 
have a property interest in the facility in which it holds a security 
interest.203 It requires a giant leap of faith and logic to assume that 
Congress, when it strove to protect inactive secured creditors from 
liability, intended to hold liable as "owners" or "operators" share-
holders who participate in management. 
C. Selecting the Correct Standard 
The courts' attempts to hold active shareholders liable under sec-
tion 101(20)(A) of CERCLA reflect judicial concern that individuals 
whose deliberate or negligent acts resulted in environmental contam-
ination not escape liability by hiding behind their status as share-
holders. It is not necessary, however, to extend CERCLA's defini-
tion of "owner" to such great lengths in order to reach active 
shareholders who are responsible for the CERCLA violations of 
their corporations. These individuals can be held liable based upon 
their activities undertaken in their roles as corporate officers or 
employees. Moreover, shareholders who abuse the corporate form, 
through undercapitalization, fraud, etc., can lose the protection of 
that form. 204 The traditional rules of corporate law still apply; under 
1291, 1293 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976». The NEPACCO court relied 
heavily upon the Eighth Circuit's construction of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1376 (1988) in reaching this result: 
The owner-operator of a vessel or a vacility [sic] has the capacity to make timely 
discovery of oil discharges. The owner-operator has power to direct the activities of 
persons who control the mechanisms causing the pollution. The owner-operator has 
the capacity to prevent and abate damage. Accordingly, the owner-operator of a 
facility governed by the [Clean Water Act], such as the Mobil facility here, must be 
regarded as a "person in charge" of the facility for the purposes of § 1161. A more 
restrictive interpretation would frustrate congressional purpose by exempting from 
the operation of the Act a large class of persons who are uniquely qualified to assume 
the burden imposed by it. 
United States v. Mobil Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1972) (quoted by Apex Oil Co., 
530 F.2d at 1293). 
202 See text accompanying note 189 supra. 
203 Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a security interest is "an interest in personal 
property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation." U.C.C. § 1-
201(37) (1978). Under the Bankruptcy Code, a "security interest" is a "lien created by an 
agreement," 11 U.S.C. § 101(45) (1988); "lien" is further defined as a "charge against or 
interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation." I d. § 101(33). 
See generally Heidt, supra note 153, at 156-57. 
204 See supra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing factors that can lead to piercing 
of corporate veil). 
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appropriate circumstances, the court can pierce the corporate veil 
to hold shareholders individually liable for the corporation's debts205 
or hold active shareholders liable for direct involvement undertaken 
in their roles as officers or employees. 206 Mere status as shareholders 
should not subject individuals to CERCLA liability. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In enacting CERCLA, Congress attempted to hold financially 
liable those parties whose activities and decisions are responsible for 
environmental hazards. Few would quibble with its goal. Legislative 
and judicial pronouncements that "the polluter should pay" resonate 
with deep chords of fairness and justice. Why should the parties 
responsible for environmental contamination not be the ones liable 
for cleaning it Up?207 
But CERCLA's broad definitions of "responsible persons" and its 
strict liability scheme can result in parties other than the "polluter" 
bearing at least part of the costs of cleanup. CERCLA's retroactive 
provisions can reach parties whose activities were entirely legal at 
the time they were undertaken; its joint and several liability provi-
sions can result in parties being held liable for harm they did not 
cause. And while holding the corporation strictly liable may well 
further the public policy goals of CERCLA, holding corporate indi-
viduals so liable does not further these goals. 
As Sophocles noted, "[t]here is a point beyond which even justice 
becomes unjust. "208 While the courts have recognized that extension 
of strict liability to individuals would take "justice" too far, in their 
efforts to modify CERCLA's strict liability provisions to create fault-
based standards applicable to individuals, the courts have formulated 
excessively broad statements of individual liability that could well 
lead to inappropriate extensions of CERCLA liability in future cases. 
Although it is easy to sympathize with the courts' intuitive desire 
to hold liable parties whose egregious and tortious actions have posed 
environmental hazards for the rest of society, we must also recognize 
the constraints of the statute that Congress has enacted. CERCLA 
imposes strict liability; considerations of fault or blameworthiness 
are, by definition, irrelevant under its terms. 
205 See supra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing piercing of corporate veil), 
206 See supra Section IV (discussing liability of officers under CERCLA). 
207 See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's statutory objectives). 
208 Sophocles, Electra, line 1043. 
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Moreover, traditional principles of corporate and agency law al-
ready provide us with adequate means for holding corporate officers 
and individual shareholders personally liable in appropriate circum-
stances. Corporate officers who personally participate in tortious 
acts may be held personally responsible;209 the corporate veil may 
be pierced to hold liable shareholders who have abused the corporate 
form, or who have used it to perpetrate a fraud. 210 True, these are 
inexact measures, and they may not impose liability upon corporate 
individuals in every instance where notions of justice or fairness 
would seem to dictate that it should fall, but CERCLA is an inexact 
statute. The problems inherent in CERCLA's poor drafting have 
been recognized since its enactment, and commentators have re-
peatedly urged its amendment. 211 Unless and until Congress under-
takes that decidedly necessary step, the courts must apply the stat-
ute carefully to ensure that corporate individuals are not subjected 
to inappropriate or excessive liability. 
Distinguishing between the courts' efforts to apply statutory lia-
bility under CERCLA and liability grounded in traditional corporate 
or agency law doctrines may seem like little more than an exercise 
in semantics, but the dangers inherent in confusing the two bases of 
liability are real, not imagined. The costs of cleaning up hazardous 
wastes are astronomical;212 few individuals have the financial re-
sources to contribute significantly to a CERCLA cleanup action. 
Thus, the economic benefits of holding individuals personally liable 
for these costs are relatively minor while the costs of holding officers 
and shareholders personally liable are high. The threat of individual 
liability can have an overwhelming chilling effect on the behavior of 
individuals because of the potential for abuse on the part of the EPA 
or other administrative bodies, or even private plaintiffs. 213 One can 
209 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing liability of corporate officers under 
traditional doctrine). 
210 See supra notes 8 & 158 and accompanying text (discussing liability of individual share-
holders under traditional doctrine). 
211 See, e.g., Heidt, supra note 153 (arguing that Congress should amend CERCLA's liability 
provisions); Lyons, supra note 91 (arguing that CERCLA's liability scheme should be aban-
doned, and that cleanups should be financed solely through tax revenues); Oesterle, supra 
note 138, at 47 n.27 (arguing that CERCLA's retroactivity is "unconscionable" and should be 
amended). 
212 See supra notes 18-20 (discussing costs of cleanups). 
213 Although the few published opinions addressing individual liability may not, on their 
facts, raise questions regarding excessive expansions of liability, we can only speculate about 
the impact of those decisions on disputes that settle without published opinions. In hearings 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1985, former EPA Administrator Lee M. Thomas 
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well imagine the pressure an individual feels who must risk personal 
financial ruin to carry out his or her duty to exercise the legal rights 
to which his or her corporation is entitled. 214 
When the benefits are so small, and the risks so great, expansion 
of liability should be undertaken cautiously. Traditional corporate 
and agency law doctrines provide certainty and ensure that most, if 
not all, of the corporate actors who engage in culpable and egregious 
behavior are held liable. Application of CERCLA to corporate in-
dividuals, because of its strict liability scheme, vague statutory lan-
guage, and confused legislative history, creates uncertainty; CER-
CLA is thus an inappropriate vehicle for the expansion of individual 
liability. 
acknowledged that the EPA uses CERCLA's expansive liability provisions as an incentive to 
induce settlement: 
The strict, joint and several liability, we find, is the only practical liability provision 
we can use in trying to go forward and have the responsible parties move forward 
with cleanup. It is a major incentive; it is an extraordinary tool as far as enforcement 
is concerned .... We use strict, joint and several liability as the major tool that 
forces settlement. 
Superfund Improvement Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 51 before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1985). Cf Robert Tomsho, Pollution Ploy: Big Corporations 
Hit by Superfund Cases Find Way to Share Bill, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1991, at Al (discussing 
pressures that large corporations bring to bear on small businesses in seeking contribution 
for cleanup costs). 
214 A rational corporate officer, confronted with these sweeping pronouncements of officer 
liability and faced with potentially ruinous individual liability, would seek to minimize his or 
her own potential exposure; inevitably, some of that minimization must come at the expense 
of the shareholders' best interests. The effect of expansive judicial interpretations of officer 
liability under CERCLA, then, may well be to drive a wedge between corporate managers 
and the shareholders they are supposed to represent. See, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 138, at 
5l. 
lt is an open question as to whether expanding liability to operating managers, many 
of whom do not participate in the waste disposal side of the business, will cause the 
managers to avoid lines of business that they ought otherwise to enter or to engage 
in excessive monitoring of environmentally sensitive behavior. Why, for example, 
would any executive join a firm that engages solely in proper waste disposal or waste 
cleanup (which itself can generate environmental hazards), when the law may change 
the applicable standards or an employee may make an operations error? In other 
words, will managers mollify their personal fear of liability at the expense of their 
shareholders' interests? 
Id.; see also Reiner H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal 
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 865 (1984) (noting that even if they are compensated for risk of 
personal liability, risk-averse managers are likely "to 'cheat' shareholders by surreptitiously 
choosing business strategies that are less profitable to the firm but less risky for its manag-
ers"). 
